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Abstract 
We study the asset pricing implications arising from imperfect investor protection using a new 
governance measure.  This is defined as the product of institutional quality in a country and the 
proportion of free float shares, which captures the impact of controlling block holders.  Using monthly 
returns of 4,756 blue chip firms from 50 international equity markets for 13 years, we show through 
tests of variants of the augmented-CAPM, that a two factor CAPM augmented with a factor mimicking 
portfolio based on our new investor protection metric yields the highest explanatory power, especially 
for markets that exhibit true variation in ownership types.  
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1. Introduction 
There is a considerable literature on the implications of ownership concentration, controlling block 
shareholders and institutional quality for the welfare of minority investors. High levels of control 
rights held by block shareholders, such as family or the state, are largely a function of the quality of 
the institutional environment (La Porta et al., 1999, 2000). This is typically associated with lower firm 
value (La Porta et al, 1999; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Doidge et al, 2004), diminished stock price and 
Tobin’s q (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Doidge et al, 2004) and underdeveloped external capital markets 
(La Porta et al, 1997, 1998). There is also mounting evidence of the proliferation of pyramiding and 
cross-shareholder networks aimed at increasing control with respect to cash flow ownership rights in 
environments characterised by weaker investor protection (La Porta et al, 1999; Khanna and Rivkin, 
2001). The combination of institutional environment and ownership diversification on minority 
investor welfare motivates us to examine whether a premium exists to compensate for this risk. 
 The emphasis on heightened control in countries with weaker investor protection is a clear 
departure from the Berle and Means (1932) view of the separation of ownership and control that may 
result from simple ownership diversification. This has led La Porta et al (1999) to argue that “….the 
theory of corporate finance relevant for most countries should focus on the incentives and 
opportunities of controlling shareholders to both benefit and expropriate the minority shareholders”. 
Gompers et al (2003) investigate the importance of governance provisions and their impact on firm 
valuation and the distribution of stock returns. Their study builds a governance index that uses a 
combination of firm and state-level shareholder protection measures to rank a universe of US listed 
stocks into ten portfolios. The extreme highest and lowest governance-ranked portfolios are termed 
democracy and dictatorship, respectively, with a returns difference between the two that remains 
unexplained in a four factor pricing model. Their model includes the Fama and French (1993) size and 
book-to-market terms plus the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum factor. More recently, 
Albuquerue and Wang (2008) develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study the 
asset pricing and welfare implications arising from imperfect investor protection. However, the closest 
fit to our work is Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) and Heinkel et al (2001), where restricted pricing 
models are constructed to account for weak segmentation in otherwise integrated universes. These 
notably stop short of yielding a tractable factor to account for systematic differences in investor 
protection and its impact on the cross section of stock returns within a convenient pricing format, such 
as CAPM. 
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We draw on this background literature and examine whether the welfare of minority investors 
can be affected by both the quality of the institutional environment and groups of insiders within the 
firm. Insiders range from managerial agents, in the traditional Berle and Means (1932) model of 
ownership diversification, to large controlling block holders. Thus, the ownership structures of firms 
can vary from a model of dispersed shareholdings to one of block holders that exercise their control 
through enhanced voting rights with respect to cash flow entitlements. 
We make three contributions to the literature. First, we introduce a new governance index to 
rank stocks based on the two principal constituents of investor protection: institutional quality and the 
proportion of free float shares. The latter is the inverse of the level of control held by block 
shareholders. We extend the ranking of stocks into ten governance-related portfolios as introduced by 
Gompers et al (2003) with the returns difference between high and low investor protection deciles 
attributed to an investor protection factor mimicking portfolio (FMP). The inclusion of the investor 
protection FMP into asset pricing models based on augmented versions of CAPM can account for 
minority investor welfare differences between strong and weak shareholder protection in firms. 
 Our second contribution lies in the association between investor protection and ownership 
structures within the underlying universe upon which asset pricing models are based. Thus, we 
consider the seven Datastream defined ownership categories for each of our ten decile-sorted 
portfolios. These are cross-shareholding networks, insider employee/family, foreign, state, investment 
companies, pension funds and other. In this way, we link investor protection, which itself is based on 
the combination of institutional quality and the proportion of ownership freely held, to the dominant 
ownership structure. This extends the La Porta et al (1997, 1998, 2000) law and finance perspective, 
which relates investor protection solely to legal origin, and the separate work of La Porta et al (1999) 
and Dyck and Zingales (2004), which relates investor protection to ownership structure. Furthermore, 
we consider the legal jurisdiction of each stock based on primary listing, sorted into the ten investor 
protection ranked portfolios. Thus, we strengthen our comparison of investor protection based on legal 
origin using the legal families identified by La Porta et al, as well as on developed versus emerging 
markets. 
 Finally, our study sits at the intersection of the law and finance, corporate governance, and 
asset pricing literatures. Our investor protection metric is based on the former two, while we subject it 
to a battery of asset pricing tests using the traditional CAPM and its variants. These are the single 
factor CAPM, the Fama and French three factor (henceforth FF3F) CAPM that includes size and book-
to-market terms, the Carhart et al (1997) four factor CAPM based on FF3F with an extra momentum 
term, and the liquidity-augmented CAPM (Liu, 2006). We also subject these, our proposed two-factor 
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investor protection augmented CAPM and their time-varying equivalent, to the Kalman filter method 
and evaluate their performance. This extends the limited focus of the Hou et al (2011) study, where the 
focus is on the choice of the optimal valuation factors in pricing models that is based on the attributes 
of the balance sheet and cash flows of the firm. Our consideration of liquidity-based transaction costs 
and their impact on firm valuation enhances the insights of the Hou et al study, and builds on the 
cumulative evidence from Amihud (2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Liu (2006) of a liquidity 
pricing premium. Our relaxation of time invariant parameter assumptions facilitates broader 
comparisons and more effective appraisal of rival pricing model frameworks. These considerations 
form our third contribution. 
Using a sample of 4,756 firms that are constituents of national blue chip indices from fifty 
international equity markets, all of which are included in the MSCI World universe comprised of both 
developed and emerging markets constituent universes over the period January 2001 to December 
2014, we specifically investigate the following questions: 
(a) Does investor protection impact on minority investor welfare and is this reflected in a 
pricing anomaly? 
(b) What are the specific limitations on applying such an investor protection model in terms of 
the prevalence of the underlying governance structure of the firm? 
The results suggest there is an unpriced premium associated with investor protection. This premium is 
reflected in statistically significant alphas in all the augmented CAPMs and their time-varying 
parameter equivalents. Furthermore, when the World universe is disaggregated into developed, 
emerging and US only markets, the premium holds with the exception of emerging markets. With 
respect to ownership type, for the World overall and developed market universes this varies across 
investor protection deciles, as expected from the literature. That is, lower quality investor protection is 
associated with higher levels of control, for example, cross shareholding networks, whereas higher 
investor protection deciles suggest an environment with dispersed ownership. Conversely, the 
Emerging market universe is overwhelmingly dominated by concentrated control across all levels of 
investor protection and this limits the effectiveness of the model. Firms that made up the US only 
universe all enjoy high quality investor protection, and subsequently this group has very few 
ownership categories associated with high levels of control that take the form of cross shareholding 
networks. In considering different types of owner, our study effectively circumvents traditional 
concerns regarding a linear monotonic association between the level of block holder concentration and 
 5 
investor protection as we consider very different types of block holder with very different separation of 
cash flow ownership from control. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the composition of the new investor 
protection factor and provides the theoretical arguments that justify its use. Section 3 describes the data 
and summary statistics and outlines the techniques used to construct the FMPs. Section 4 describes the 
time-invariant augmented CAPM models and their time-varying parameter counterparts, and section 5 
reports and discusses the empirical findings. Section 6 presents the robustness tests using an alternative 
proxy for institutional quality. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Institutions, governance and ownership 
2.1 Investor protection measure 
Our investor protection measure is the product of country level institutional quality and the proportion 
of firm-level free float shares. This is defined as 
   ijtjtijt Float FreeQuality nalInstitutioProtectionInvestor     (1) 
for country i at year t and Free Float is the mean monthly percentage of free float shares for each listed 
firm j. 
Institutional quality is formed from the average of the six World Bank governance indicators: 
control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and democratic voice, and accountability (Kaufman et al, 2009).1 These 
indicators range from -2.5 to +2.5 but here have been rescaled to take a value between 0 – 10. Country 
i refers to the primary listing location of firm j. We adopt the country of primary listing as opposed to 
the country of incorporation on the basis of the “legal bonding” hypothesis of Coffee (1999, 2002) and 
Charitou et al (2007). Firms incorporated in an overseas jurisdiction adopt or “legally bond” to the 
governance arrangements of the country of their primary listing. The governance indicators were first 
reported in 1996 and were updated at two yearly intervals until 2002, after which they were produced 
annually. In the early years of the series, the indicators in the intermediate year were assumed to be the 
same as in the preceding one, given the relatively slow nature of institutional change (Williamson, 
2000, 2002; North, 1991, 1994). 
Free float shares are the proportion of total issued shares from the primary listing of firm j not 
held by block holders. Information on the free float proportion is easy to access for a wide cross 
                                                 
1 The six indicators are recalculated and updated every two years and were calculated back to 1999. Source: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. See Appendix B Table 1B for definitions. 
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section of stocks, and is used here. This is particularly important given the difficulty in tracing 
controlling owners within extended pyramidal and cross shareholding networks, such as business 
groups, where offshore entities, opaque nominee accounts and private, unlisted holding companies are 
frequently used to extend their control over a firm. Datastream categorizes block holders into seven 
types: government, cross-holdings, pension funds, investment companies, employees and family, other 
block entities, and foreign block holders (see Appendix B, Table 1B). Prior to August 2009, data on 
shareholdings and free float shares were reported on a monthly basis, but more recently they are 
reported on the 10th and 30th of each month. Two points should be noted. First, the percentage 
ownership threshold, after which a holding is considered as a block, changed in April 2005. 
Previously, there was no threshold but after April 2005 the SEC breakpoint of 5% was widely adopted. 
This means that no direct comparison of the level of block shareholdings and the proportion of free 
float is valid before and after the change. However, this is immaterial in our case as our focus is on the 
construction of the investor protection metric on an annual basis. The second point concerns the 
approach to missing data in some categories of block ownership holdings. Discrete periods that lack 
data on percentage ownership holdings are allocated a value of 0%, leading to the proportion of free 
float being 100% for the period of the missing data. These omissions and missing periods are relatively 
rare, although more frequent in emerging economies. We address such gaps in the time series for each 
category of block owner per firm by using the last known ownership percentage value for that 
shareholder. Finally, since the investor protection measure is the product of the institutional quality 
and proportion of free float, both of which are percentages, the resulting metric is denominated in units 
ranging from 0 to 10,000.  
Instead of using the proportion of free float, which is easy to compute for our broad cross 
section of stocks to capture the potential risks of minority shareholder expropriation, a better measure 
is proposed by Claessens et al (2000, 2002) and Lins (2003). Their suggestion extends the arguments 
of Bebchuk (1999) and La Porta et al (1999) that controlling block shareholders revise their holdings 
relatively infrequently and with little dilution of their overall control, owing to their accentuated 
private benefits. It is worth noting that despite the obvious incentives for controlling block 
shareholders to expropriate minorities in terms of firm value, there are potential benefits associated 
with concentrated ownership by this group due to their increased incentive to monitor the incumbent 
management and insiders, which is likely to lead to reduced agency costs.  However, while Claessens 
et al (2000) argue that the wedge between cash flow and voting control rights arguably better captures 
the potential risk of minority shareholder expropriation, the proportion of free float is much easier to 
compute for a broad cross section of stocks.  Thus, this is the preferred choice in our setting. 
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In summary, since institutional quality and free float are assumed to be complements, an 
improvement in the quality of corporate governance associated with an increase in institutional quality 
is greater for a firm with higher free float. 
 
2.2 Relationship between institutions, dispersed ownership and investor protection 
Our theoretical model is based on the notion of perfectly integrated capital markets that are subject to 
mild segmentation in the form of differing levels of corporate control. This extends the restricted 
CAPM model of Errunza and Losq (1985) and Merton (1987) and follows the intuition developed in 
Heinkel et al (2001) in considering the asset pricing implications arising from a subset of investors 
emerging from within a given universe.  Further, we assume that at any given time there is a finite 
number of listed firms and a finite pool of investors. Following Giannetti and Koskinen, (2010), two 
categories of investors are considered: minority portfolio investors and controlling shareholders. 
However, we further assume that controlling shareholders are only associated with firms that have 
weak investor protection, where this is reflected in higher ownership concentration in the form of large 
block holdings, and consequently a minimal free float would be available to minority portfolio 
investors. Conversely, firms with strong investor protection attract few controlling shareholders and, 
with minimal block holdings, these broad, dispersed ownership patterns are reflected in high free 
floats. Following Giannetti and Koskinen (2010), we argue that there are two payoffs arising from 
shares. The first is attributable to all security holders in the form of dividends and capital gains, while 
the second is preferential access to private benefits that accrue only to controlling block shareholders. 
 Thus, firms with weak investor protection are attractive solely to controlling shareholders who 
compete to acquire full control over firms through large block shareholdings. Conversely, firms with 
strong investor protection have widely dispersed investor bases with few, if any, block holdings. We 
argue that investor protection is not only reflected in ownership concentration but also in the quality of 
the overall national institutional environment. Here, institutional quality is viewed as complementary 
to ownership concentration and the market for corporate control. This is supported by Klapper and 
Love (2004), who find that average firm level governance, and hence investor protection, is lower in 
countries with weaker legal systems. Therefore, governance within the firm is correlated with 
contractual imperfections and levels of asymmetric information in their national environment. We also 
follow North (1991, 1994), who claims that the institutional development within a given society, or 
country, is a function of the continuous interaction between firm transactions, the ruling polity and the 
wider population and this acts as a check or balance to the moral authority of the state. In this way the 
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internal governance of the firm is inextricably linked to the external institutional quality by the nature 
of the political economy. 
 As noted above, at the centre of our model is the assumption of perfectly integrated capital 
markets that are mildly segmented by restrictions in corporate control. Thus, controlling shareholders 
exert their control through larger block ownership holdings in firms with weak investor protection, 
situations that also exhibit greater information asymmetry. Here, the expropriation of private benefits 
motivates their participation as these augment otherwise low risk-adjusted returns associated with such 
weak investor protection firms. Thus, we follow Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) and Heinkel et al 
(2001) and assume a monotonic association between ownership concentration and investor protection 
that is based on the entrenchment effect of large controlling block holders. 
 Our model focusses on the welfare implications for minority portfolio investors arising from 
the need to diversify by optimising portfolios that draw on a wide cross section of stocks from weak to 
strong investor protection firms. Given the mild segmentation assumption, arbitrage trading to close 
price differentials is impeded, reflecting the laws of supply and demand (Errunza and Losq, 1985; 
Heinkel et al, 2001). In this way, weaker investor protection stocks attract controlling shareholders due 
to the relative ease of extraction of private benefits in an environment of informational asymmetry and 
opacity in financial reporting and governance practices. Such controlling shareholders dominate 
ownership of firms through large block holdings and consequently minimal free floats are available for 
minority portfolio investors. However, the limited supply is offset by a lack of demand by minority 
portfolio investors given they face the risk of expropriation. Thus, the stock price decreases in 
equilibrium to reflect the risks associated with informational asymmetry and increased expropriation 
risk. Therefore, minority portfolio investors demand higher expected returns to compensate for this 
lower price and this is reflected in a positive premium. 
 Conversely, in firms operating in an environment with high levels of investor protection, the 
ownership base is formed from widely dispersed minority portfolio investors and an absence of 
controlling blocks. The absence of controlling block shareholders implies a reduction in entrenchment 
and expropriation risk, while higher institutional quality implies greater protection of property rights 
for minority investors. Thus, the demand for these shares is greater and the price is driven up. The 
enhanced price is a reflection of a discount because of the lower risk and therefore expected return. 
 Our model considers a continuum of investor protection, ranging from weak to strong, 
following Giannetti and Koskinen (2010). However, we implicitly consider a notional average level 
where minority investors expect a premium when participating in weak investor protection stocks and 
a discount when participating in high investor protection stocks. These differences lead us to anticipate 
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a persistent difference in the cross section of stock returns, attributable to institutional quality and free 
float. 
 Despite evidence on the links between the welfare of minority investors, ownership structure 
and institutional quality, there is very little in the literature that approaches this using an asset pricing 
framework. A seminal paper is Gompers et al (2003),2 who created a governance index and used state- 
and firm-level governance to rank a universe of US firms into decile portfolios ranging from the 
weakest governance, or dictatorship portfolio, to the strongest, or democracy portfolio. The market 
universe is taken from the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) and includes approximately 
1,500 stocks, which account for over 93% of capitalization of the New York stock exchange (NYSE), 
the American stock exchange (AMEX) and Nasdaq. These ten governance-ranked decile portfolios 
were used in an application of the Carhart et al (1997) four factor augmented-CAPM pricing model. 
This is the standard CAPM augmented by size and book-to-market factors (Fama and French, 1993) 
plus the momentum factor. Un-priced premiums, the alphas, were found across all deciles, and those 
associated with the lowest and the highest governance quality deciles were statistically significant. The 
application of the Carhart et al (1997) four factor model to a zero-cost portfolio, which reflects a 
structure of buying firms in the weakest governance category and selling in the highest, resulted in 
annualized abnormal returns of 8.5%. The Gompers study also found that firms with stronger 
shareholder rights had higher value, higher profits, higher sales growth and lower capital expenditures, 
all consistent with La Porta et al (2000, 2002). However, despite finding evidence of a premium, no 
asset pricing application was proposed. This literature forms the basis of our first proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: Welfare losses arising from diversification between weak and strong investor 
protection firms are reflected in a premium 
 
In its broadest terms, our proposed theoretical view of investor protection is based on varying 
transaction costs that ultimately impact the property rights of minority investors seeking diversification 
across a mildly segmented but otherwise perfectly integrated market universe. While we link 
systematic changes in corporate control rights using institutional quality and levels of controlling block 
shareholdings to diversification premia and the cross section of stock returns, our measure is most 
closely associated with a liquidity effect. Liquidity provides an alternative measure of transaction costs 
                                                 
2 Albuquerue and Wang (2008) develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study the association between 
asset pricing and the welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. They find that countries with weaker investor 
protection attract larger risk premia, greater return volatility, lower Tobin’s q and higher interest rates. This is in line with 
our theoretical model. 
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that vary systematically across the cross section of stock returns. Further to traditional approaches, 
such as Goyenko et al (2009), Lesmond (2005) and Hearn (2014), which contrast various liquidity 
metrics in capturing transaction costs, we adopt the multidimensional measure of Liu (2006). This 
combines a modified turnover ratio measured in terms of volume traded, with the proportion of daily 
zero trading volume days per month, to measure trading speed. This provides a multidimensional focus 
of transaction costs and improves on the limitations of more singular volume-based or simple price-
impact measures, while also capturing a dimension of trading frequency. Thus, liquidity provides an 
obvious stock-ranking metric based on transaction costs, which are influenced by institutional quality, 
market microstructure and corporate governance (Bewley, 2002; O'Hara, 2003). However, the 
transaction costs captured are, by nature, external and do not reflect the ownership of the firm, and 
directly impacts corporate strategy and executive decision-making that are at the heart of our new 
investor protection measure. 
 Other factors commonly used to explain the cross section of stock returns are in Fama and 
French (1993), that is additional premiums attributable to persistent differences in size and accounting 
book to market value of stocks. Size premium in particular relates to small market capitalization firms 
that persistently underperform in terms of earnings during and following wider financial and economic 
downturns than larger firms (Fama and French, 1993). Accounting book to market value captures 
differences across the cross section in terms of underlying value, with high ratio firms less costly but 
with higher intrinsic value stocks while the opposite is true for low ratio firms. Fama and French 
(1993) proposed a three factor CAPM model with size and book to market value factors in addition to 
the simple market factor. Carhart et al (1997) extended this by adding a momentum factor on top of the 
underlying Fama and French (1993) model to create a four factor version. Momentum relies on the 
past returns performance of stocks with a premium attributed to differences in the cross section of 
stock returns between low and high performing stocks (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, 2001). However, 
a shortcoming is that size, book to market and momentum factors are based on fundamentals and 
performance and ignores any consideration of transaction costs, where these are most likely the source 
of any deviation. Thus, we propose the following: 
 
Proposition 2: Investor protection is more robust in capturing the cross section of stock returns than 
liquidity, momentum, accounting book to market value or size measures 
 
We perform a number of procedures to test the above propositions. Firstly, we disaggregate the World 
overall universe into three components: a developed and an emerging economy universe and the US as 
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a single country. These universes are selected on the basis of classification by MSCI (see Appendix A, 
Table 1A) into developed and emerging market groups. This simple differentiation between the MSCI 
defined universes also reflects the variation in types of control structure. In the emerging universe 
case, this is dominated by cross-shareholding networks and pyramidal governance, which is different 
from the developed universe where there is greater genuine variation and a sizeable proportion of firms 
adhere to the dispersed ownership model. This distinction based on MSCI classification facilitates tests 
of the above propositions and provide an additional context for the asset pricing models. Secondly, we 
test our new investor protection metric by formulating a returns-based factor in a simple two-factor 
augmented CAPM framework and compare the performance of this with FF3F, Carhart 4F (including 
momentum), and Liquidity-augmented two-factor models for each of the four universes. We also 
compare monthly-rebalancing and annual-rebalancing factor portfolio construction techniques with 
different valuation factors. Additionally, we relax the time invariant parameter assumptions of the 
traditional CAPM framework and adopt the Kalman filter approach to the FF3F, Carhart 4F (including 
momentum), Liquidity 2F, and Investor Protection 2F models and compare the performance of each. 
This yields a robust method of evaluating factor performance in explaining the cross section of stock 
returns.  
Finally, we test the robustness of our results by using an alternative proxy for institutional 
quality, the “Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights Index” developed by Gwartney and 
Lawson (2007), which focusses on the legal security of property rights for minorities. Our results are 
on the whole robust. 
 
3. Data and summary statistics 
3.1 Sample selection 
Our sample is constructed in two stages. The first sorts all markets in MSCI defined3 as developed and 
emerging. The second selects stock-level data from the major blue-chip index constituent lists in 
Datastream (see Appendix A, Table 1A). This criterion ensures they conform to international 
investors’ selection requirements in terms of marketability and accessibility (foreign ownership 
restrictions). It also avoids the problem of selection bias that can arise from pre-determined minimum 
price criteria, as found in Hou et al (2011). The blue-chip index constituent stocks also conform to 
international asset diversification assumptions regarding inter-market asset market integration that is 
essential to the CAPM, and thus avoids intra-market segmentation prevalent in emerging stock 
markets. 
                                                 
3 MSCI definitions are from: http://www.msci.com/products/indexes/country_and_regional/dm/ 
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 The data are from January 2000 to August 2014. This is relatively short but reflects the period 
within which many emerging and frontier markets were established and adopted conventional data 
disclosure and financial reporting. The data includes single class ordinary shares only and excludes 
preference shares, dual class shares, warrants, convertibles, REITs, closed-end funds, exchange traded 
funds and depository receipts. Finally, where any return above 300% that is reversed within one month 
is treated as missing, that is, if Rt or Rt-1 is greater than 300%, and (1 + Rt)*(1 + Rt-1) - 1 < 50%, then 
both Rt and Rt-1 are set to missing.  This follows Ince and Porter (2003). 
 Following Hou et al (2011), we ensure accounting ratios are known before returns and thus 
match the end of year financial statement data for year t-1 with monthly returns from July of year t to 
June of year t + 1. We use the inverse of the market-to-book-ratio (see Appendix B, Table 1B) to 
calculate the Book to Market Value ratios. In addition, size is defined as the market value of equity at 
the end of June of year t, while momentum (Mom) for month t is the cumulative return from month t – 
6 to month t – 2, skipping month t – 1 to avoid microstructure biases such as bid-ask bounce or non-
synchronous trading. 
 The final sample comprises 4,756 common stocks from 50 markets worldwide, all of which are 
constituents of blue chip indices. The sample consists of 3,077 stocks from 24 MSCI-designated 
developed markets and 1,679 from 26 MSCI-designated emerging markets. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of the sample over the period January 2000 to August 2014. Our sample selection criterion 
of using blue chip constituent stocks gives a universe that is not dominated by US stocks. The mean 
number of North American stocks is 743.49, or 19% of the sample and Europe developed (21%).   
Asia emerging (18%) and Asia developed (11%) are the next largest contributors. The remainder are 
Middle East & Africa emerging (7%), Latin America (5%), Europe emerging (3%) and Middle East & 
Africa developed (2%). The rest are from Australasia and Scandinavia.  Figure 2 shows the 
development of the sample over time. This is largely a result of including an increasing number of 
emerging markets, such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates. 
Figures 1 and 2 
 
3.2 Liquidity measurement 
There are multiple liquidity estimators in the literature and for a comprehensive review and assessment 
of their relative performance see Goyenko et al (2009). Given our focus on monthly and annual 
measures and their performance, the choice of liquidity metric is constrained to a low frequency 
application. A further constraint arises from the heterogeneous sample, which includes some of the 
most developed and active markets and some of the least developed. Thus, price impact measures, 
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such as Amihud (2002), are not appropriate given the illiquidity of many emerging markets (Lesmond, 
2005). In addition, volume-based measures, such as the turnover ratio, over-estimate liquidity at times 
of severe market distress, for example, capital flight at times of financial crisis. The daily zero returns 
measure of Lesmond et al (1999) is particularly suitable for small, inactive emerging markets, but not 
for highly liquid ones, such as the US. A further limitation with almost all low frequency estimators is 
that liquidity is a one dimensional phenomenon. Liu (2006) introduced a multidimensional measure 
designed to capture the trading speed dimension of liquidity. This is a combination of an adjusted 
turnover term and the proportion of daily zero volume trading days in a given month, and is the metric 
of choice in this study. It is defined as LMx which is the standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero 
daily trading volumes over the prior x months (x = 1, 6, 12), stated: 
xLM  =  months-prior xin  mesdaily volu of No.  + 





Deflator
turnovermonthx1  NoTDx21  (2) 
 
where x month turnover is the turnover over the prior x months, daily turnover is the ratio of the 
number of shares traded on a day to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the day, NoTD is 
the total number of trading days over the prior x months, and Deflator is chosen such that, 
 
1
1
0 
Deflator
turnovermonthx         (3) 
 
for all sample stocks4. With the turnover adjustment (the second term in brackets in (2)), two stocks 
with the same integer number of zero daily trading volumes can be distinguished, that is, the one with 
the larger turnover is more liquid. Thus, the turnover adjustment acts as a tie-breaker when sorting 
stocks based on the number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior x months. Because the number 
of trading days can vary from 15 to 23, multiplication by the factor (21x/NoTD) standardises the 
number of trading days in a month to 21, which makes the liquidity measure comparable over time. 
LM1 can be interpreted as the turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior 
year. LMx is calculated at the end of each year for each stock based on daily data. 
 
3.3 Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of monthly returns (in US$), the percentage proportion of free 
float, country-level institutional quality, the new investor protection measure and other firm-level 
characteristics. All countries are grouped according to their MSCI categories of developed versus 
                                                 
4 Following Liu (2006), a deflator of 11,000 is used to estimate LM1. 
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emerging. Following the definition by La Porta et al (2008), 4 countries are classified as following 
Scandinavian civil code, 17 English common law, 19 French civil code and 10 German civil code. A 
number of observations can be noted. First, institutional quality across the MSCI developed markets is 
almost twice that of the emerging markets. Second, English common law nations are associated with 
higher institutional quality compared to the majority of civil code countries, reflecting the work of La 
Porta et al (1999, 2000). However, in contrast to La Porta et al, where civil code is grouped together 
under a single category, Scandinavian civil code is separate from German and French and is associated 
with some of the highest institutional quality worldwide. 
The investor protection metric ranges from 7,689.36 in Norway and 6,850.25 in Japan to 
1,680.02 in Colombia and 1,550.49 in Indonesia. This is also reflected in the percentage proportions of 
free float, which ranges from 82.13% in Norway and 84.60% in Japan to 35.41% in Chile, 39.38% in 
the Philippines and 39.45% in Portugal. However, liquidity and momentum do not follow the same 
pattern. For these metrics, Japan has a value of 15.66 for the Liu metric, which is one of the lowest and 
hence the most liquid market, while Norway is one of the highest with a value of 101.68 and similar to 
the emerging Dubai market of 115.37. But, apart from these two markets, high investor protection is 
generally closely associated with high liquidity, as is the case in North America, the large and 
developed markets of Europe, and in Australasia. Similarly, low levels of investor protection, 
proportion of free float and liquidity are in the emerging markets of Middle East & Africa. Momentum 
is similarly varied, with emerging markets higher than developed ones. Mean firm size is generally 
higher in developed markets, ranging from US$ 69.76 billion in Hong Kong and US$ 25.77 billion in 
the UK to US$ 1.38 billion in Peru and US$ 0.60 billion in Egypt. There is wide variation in book-to-
market value ratios in these markets with 3.55 in Colombia, 2.29 in Germany and 2.09 in the 
Netherlands compared with 0.46 in South Africa, 0.54 in the UK, and 0.30 in Thailand, although here 
there is no obvious dichotomy between developed and emerging markets. Finally, the time series of 
monthly returns per market varies from highs of 2.22% in Canada, 2.53% in Russia (both Micex and 
RTS) and 2.72% in Taiwan to lows of 0.66% in Hungary, 0.67% in Japan and 0.70% in Greece. 
Table 1 
 
4 Factors driving returns 
4.1 The construction of Factor Mimicking Portfolios (FMPs) 
To study the influence of factors, such as size, book to market value, momentum and liquidity on the 
variation of world stock returns, we follow Fama and French (1993), Liu (2006) and Hou et al (2011) 
and construct returns-based proxies using zero-investment portfolios. These portfolios go long in 
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stocks with high values of a given characteristic and short in stocks with low values for that 
characteristic. We use the time-series regressions of Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), following Fama 
and French (1993) and more recently Liu (2006), to assess the pricing implications arising from the 
liquidity metric. In this approach, the excess returns on test portfolios are regressed on the returns of 
FMPs. The time series slopes are interpreted as factor loadings that inform how various combinations 
of these FMPs explain the average returns across the portfolios. We form market portfolios based on 
both equal and value weighted returns of all stocks within a universe at a given time and use the yield 
on the 10 year US Treasury bill as our risk free rate. 
 We use size and book to market value (Fama and French, 1993), momentum (Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993) and liquidity (Liu, 2006) to form the FMPs using two different techniques. The first 
creates 25 quintile portfolios using a two-stage sorting process. The stocks are sorted into five 
portfolios based on size, and then sorted again by book to market value. At any time, those with 
missing values for either characteristic are omitted, as are stocks with negative book to market values. 
FMPs relating to size are created from average returns on small size portfolios minus those on big size 
portfolios (SMB factor) and similarly with high book to market value portfolios minus low book to 
market portfolios (HML factor). Portfolio rebalancing takes place annually in June, following Fama 
and French (1993) and Hou et al (2011). SMB and HML factors are formed from value-weighted 
returns. 
 Construction of the momentum and liquidity FMPs are slightly different. These use 10 decile 
portfolios with stocks ranked on momentum across portfolios, where momentum is defined as the 
cumulative return over the preceding six months, and on liquidity, defined as in Liu (2006). The FMP 
for momentum follows the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) six-month/six-month strategy, where monthly 
returns are an equally weighted average of six individual strategies of buying the winning decile 
portfolio and selling the losing decile portfolio. Rebalancing occurs monthly.5 In order to minimize the 
bid-ask bounce effect, we skip one month between ranking and holding periods when constructing the 
momentum FMP. This FMP is formed from equal-weighted returns. 
 The liquidity FMP is created by first ranking stocks by their Liu (2006) liquidity metrics. These 
are sorted into 10 decile portfolios and the FMP formed from returns difference between high 
illiquidity decile portfolios and low illiquidity decile portfolios. Then, two FMPs are created based on 
the frequency of rebalancing. The first is rebalanced annually in December, following Fama and 
French (1993). The second is rebalanced monthly with the FMP returns formed from the averages 
                                                 
5 That is, the momentum FMP return for January 2001 is 1/6 of the return spread between the winners and losers from July 
– November 2000, 1/6 of the return spread between winners and losers from June – October 2000, etc. 
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across each of twelve annually held liquidity FMPs, similar to the method used for the momentum 
portfolio in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)6. This was also used as a robustness check in Liu (2006). 
 Finally, the FMP based on our new investor protection measure is created by ranking stocks by 
their individual investor protection metric. Ranking is by the prior month and year. The ranked stocks 
are then sorted by each period and then put into 10 decile portfolios with the investor protection FMP 
created from returns difference between low investor protection decile portfolios and high investor 
protection decile portfolios. In common with the liquidity portfolios, two investor protection FMPs are 
formed based on the frequency of rebalancing. The first is an annual rebalancing in December of each 
year, following Fama and French (1993), and with an annual holding period. The second is a monthly 
rebalancing, with annual holding periods. The resulting FMP returns are created from the averages 
across each of twelve annually held investor protection FMPs, similar to the method used for the 
liquidity FMPs. Given the investor protection metric is formed from the product of free float and 
institutional quality, stocks sorted into the lower investor protection decile portfolios have potential 
benefits. These can arise from the concentrated cash flow rights of block holders, a greater incentive to 
monitor in order to offset the weakness of the external contracting environment and the lack of 
minority shareholder protection afforded from state institutions (Lins, 2003). On the other hand, the 
higher investor protection decile portfolios include stocks characterised by high institutional quality 
jurisdictions, which are more supportive of enhanced minority shareholder rights, as reflected in high 
proportions of free float and few block holders. This is in line with the classic Berle and Means (1932) 
separation of ownership from control governance model. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics of Factor Mimicking Portfolios 
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, autocorrelations and cross-correlations of monthly 
returns of the FMPs using the entire sample. Of these, the market portfolio has an average excess 
return of 1.213% over the 164-month horizon and is statistically significant (t-stat 2.85). We select the 
equal-weighted market portfolio. This has an approximately normal distribution, according to the 
Jarque-Bera statistic rather than the value-weighted market portfolios, which are highly non-normal. 
The difference in distribution between these two returns series is also reflected in the levels of kurtosis 
and skewness. These results are not reported but are available from the authors on request. 
 We are especially interested in the effectiveness of the monthly versus annually rebalanced 
liquidity and investor protection FMPs. While small premiums do not necessarily discriminate 
                                                 
6 That is, this liquidity FMP return for January 2005 is formed from 1/12 of the return spread between high liquidity ranked 
stocks and low liquidity ranked stocks for January 2003 - January 2004, 1/12 of return spread between high and low 
liquidity stocks for February 2003 through February 2004, etc. 
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between rival FMPs in terms of return co-movement, their standard deviations may. Panel 1 shows that 
while the annual FMPs have slightly lower premiums, they also have higher volatility. Also, annual 
liquidity and investor protection FMPs have minimal skewness and low levels of kurtosis. Another 
approach is to examine the correlations as if these are high they are likely to be capturing the same 
underlying factors. Thus, we omitted the monthly liquidity and investor protection FMPs as they are 
highly correlated with the annual ones (see panel 2). Therefore, the factors included in the time series 
asset pricing tests are the equally weighted market excess returns, the value-weighted size and book-
to-market FMPs, the equal-weighted momentum FMP, and the annually-rebalanced equal-weighted 
liquidity and investor protection FMPs. 
 It is worth noting that of these FMP’s, those attributable to HML and Investor Protection are 
smallest in average returns –under 0.50% - although all are statistically significant (1 year Investor 
Protection has a t-stat 2.36, while its 1 month counterparts has a -stat of 2.28). This implies that while 
premiums do exist for each of these factors they are smaller in absolute size. It is also worthwhile to 
note that the standard deviations of returns for both 1 year and 1 month Investor Protection FMPs are 
by far the lowest of all FMPs at 2.592% for 1 year and 2.574% for 1 month. This indicates a greater 
degree of certainty in the existence of investor protection premiums, despite their smaller absolute size. 
Finally, it is also notable that both investor protection FMPs have the least skewness and kurtosis and 
the lowest Jarque-Bera statistics (indicating greater Normality in returns distributions) compared to 
any other FMP. 
 In terms of correlations (see Table 2, panel 2) it can be observed that both liquidity FMPs (1 
year and 1 month) have higher correlations (slightly over 0.50) with the market portfolio as well as 
both investor protection FMPs (1 year and 1 month). This questions the support for proposition 2. One 
explanation for this is the efficacy of the Liu liquidity metric, which is based on the ability to capture 
the multidimensional nature of liquidity where dimensions are impacted by institutional quality. A 
second explanation focusses on the specific type of block ownership where, in the case of cross-
shareholder networks, this leads to a separation of voting control away from cash flow ownership 
rights (Lins, 2003). A literature based on La Porta et al (1999) argues that such separation of 
ownership from control engenders increased informational asymmetries and enhances expropriation 
risks, which leads to increased illiquidity. Consequently, it is notable that a limitation arises from 
potential overlap in the effects captured by each of the distinct FMPs. Finally, concerns regarding 
autocorrelations are mitigated due to their low absolute size and negligible statistical significance over 
1, 6, and 12 month lagged periods. (Table 2, panel 3). 
Table 2 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Investor Protection Portfolios 
Table 3 panel 1 reports the characteristics of the stocks for the overall universe in each of the ten decile 
investor protection portfolios with respect to geographical region, legal origin and form of ownership. 
It shows clear trends across all decile portfolios in terms of the country of primary listing. In common 
with La Porta et al (1998, 2000) we find that the highest investor protection deciles are dominated by 
stocks from English common law markets, while the lowest are dominated by French civil code stocks. 
In addition, there is an increasing trend in the proportion of stocks from German civil code countries 
towards the lowest investor protection deciles. Unlike La Porta et al (1998), we find that Scandinavian 
civil code stocks are more closely associated with English common law and exhibit a dramatically 
increasing trend towards higher investor protection deciles. This suggests a similar level of investor 
protection in Scandinavian civil code and English common law countries. 
When we separate stocks by legal family of the country of their primary listing, and by 
developed or emerging country groups using the MSCI definition (see Appendix A, Table 1A), these 
trends are further accentuated. Although not in the highest investor protection deciles (D9 and D10), 
stocks from emerging English common law countries are more evenly dispersed across deciles D1 to 
D7. The developed country common law returns are heavily concentrated in high investor protection 
portfolios and reflect a move from minimal participation in lowest investor protection deciles to over 
50% of the population of highest investor protection decile (D10). Stocks in emerging French civil 
code countries are heavily concentrated in the two weakest investor protection deciles (D1 and D2), 
while developed countries have a relatively even dispersion across D2 to D10. This provides further 
support for the relative weakness of French civil law jurisdictions in terms of investor protection, at all 
levels of economic development. Developed German civil code stocks are even more evenly 
distributed across all ten investor protection deciles than those under French civil code, with only a 
slight increase in concentration in the highest decile (D10). However, emerging countries using 
German civil code are concentrated in the lowest two investor protection deciles (D1 and D2). These 
findings are consistent and support the hypothesis that German and French civil code legal 
jurisdictions are markedly weaker than other legal origin families in providing investor protection. 
 We examine regional effects and find two noticeable patterns. The first concerns the developed 
markets of North America, Australasia and Scandinavia, all of which have very strong trends from 
minimal participation in lowest investor protection deciles towards increased concentration in the 
highest deciles. The developed markets in Europe reflect a more even distribution across all deciles. In 
Asia, the developed markets have the highest concentration in the middle group of mid-ranking 
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investor protection portfolios (D3 to D9). The second concerns emerging regions, such as Latin 
America, Europe emerging, Middle East & Africa and Asia, where concentrations of stocks are in the 
lowest investor protection portfolios. This also supports the hypothesis that investor protection varies 
with levels of economic development (La Porta et al, 2000). 
 Finally, the evidence from geographic dispersion of stocks across the decile investor protection 
portfolios – formed from the World universe – implies some support for the notion of an “emerging 
market premium” over that associated solely with developed country stocks. This can be seen from the 
dispersion of stocks between MSCI Emerging and MSCI Developed categories ranging from deciles 
D1 to D10. However, this evidence is not clear cut owing to over 25% of the stocks in lowest investor 
protection decile (D1) originating from MSCI Developed markets. Further questions of the strength of 
such an emerging market premium arise from consideration of ownership structure, in the context of 
the separation of cash flow ownership (the definition of traditional block holder) and voting control 
(see Claessens et al, 2002 and Lins, 2003). This justifies the division of the World universe into 
distinct World developed, emerging and US only sub-universes. 
Table 3 
 
The summary statistics for firm characteristics for the ten investor protection decile portfolios 
are also reported in Table 3, with the overall universe in panel 2 and the US only universe in panel 3. 
These support the existence of an investor protection governance premium between firms with high 
ownership concentration in low institutional quality environments and to those that are widely held in 
high institutional quality environments. First, there are significant returns differences between the 
highest (D10) and the lowest (D1) investor protection decile portfolios, whether equal or value 
weighted. Returns on lowest investor protection deciles (D1) are much higher than the high investor 
protection ones (D10). Second, there is the expected difference between the lowest and the highest 
investor protection deciles in terms of the investor protection metric and the proportion of free float 
(%). Both are statistically significant (p < 0.005). The proportion of free float in the weakest decile 
(D1) in the overall universe is less than a quarter of that in the strongest decile (D10), confirming high 
ownership concentration in the weaker investor protection deciles. Similarly, the investor protection 
metric in the highest investor protection decile (D10) is almost eight times that of the lowest investor 
protection decile (D1). Third, the book-to-market ratios are significantly lower in the weakest investor 
protection portfolio (D1) compared to the high investor protection portfolio (D10), while momentum is 
higher in the weakest deciles (D1) compared to the strongest (D10). Fourthly, there are statistically 
significant differences between the highest and the lowest investor protection deciles in terms of 
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liquidity, size, traded volume, price rigidity and price. In the overall universe (panel 1) liquidity is 
much lower, as shown by the high values of the Liu (2006) metric and price rigidity higher, as shown 
by the high proportion of daily zero returns per month in the lowest investor protection decile (D1 
versus D10). These differences are statistically significant (p < 0.005). In both the overall (panel 1) and 
US only (panel 2) universes, stock size and price is lower in the weakest investor protection decile 
(D1) than in the strongest (D10). These differences are also statistically significant (p < 0.005).  
These findings fit the theory with respect to low investor protection, that is, where there are 
weaker minority shareholder rights the stock market plays a less important role in the economy 
compared to high investor protection environments (La Porta et al, 1997, 1998). The lower price 
associated with lower investor protection deciles supports the view that poorer investor protection and 
the greater likelihood of insider or controlling shareholder expropriation of minorities, leads to lower 
prices (La Porta et al, 1999, 2000). Finally, there is an inverse relationship between the overall (panel 
2) and the US only (panel 3) universes with respect to traded volume. In the overall universe, the 
volume of shares traded in the weakest investor protection decile (D1) is far greater (1,886m shares) 
than that in the strongest decile (D10) (48.97m shares). This difference is statistically significant (p < 
0.005). However, the opposite relationship is found in the US only universe. Here, the weakest 
investor protection decile has the lowest traded volume (94.89m shares) and the strongest has the 
highest volume (182.78m shares). This latter relationship is also statistically significant (p < 0.005) 
and supports the view of a relationship between the quality of investor protection to the size, 
development and activity of external financial markets (La Porta et al, 1997, 1998). 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Time-invariant empirical results 
Our two-factor CAPM augmented with the new investor protection factor to account for institutional 
differences across international markets and the comparisons with existing models are in Appendix C, 
Table 1C. These are the CAPM, the Fama and French three factor model (FF3F), the Carhart four 
factor model, that is, the FF3F model augmented with an additional momentum factor (Carhart 4F) and 
the Liu liquidity two factor model (Liquidity 2F). All models are estimated using time series OLS, 
following Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), Fama and French (1993), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) 
and Liu (2006). The expectation is that the Jensen alpha should not be statistically different from zero, 
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given the relationship between an individual portfolio’s expected returns and the market (Markowitz 
1959)7. 
The estimation results of the augmented CAPM models on the equally-weighted ten investor 
protection decile portfolios and the equally-weighted and value-weighted FMP using D1 - D10 are 
reported in Table 4. These are given for all four universes: World overall, developed, emerging and US 
in panels 1 to 4 respectively. A general finding for all ten investor protection deciles (D1 to D10) in all 
models (the CAPM, FF3F, Carhart 4F, Liquidity 2F and the new Investor Protection 2F) is that the 
adjusted-R2 increases by between 1% to 5% in the Investor Protection 2F model (see panel E) 
compared to all other models in each of the universes. However, the strongest support for the new 
Investor Protection 2F model is the reduced statistical significance of the alpha terms for all decile 
portfolios relative to the other models in the four market universes. A final characteristic of the 
Investor Protection 2F models is the sign on the investor protection FMP coefficient. Common to the 
four universes is the positive, large and statistically significant coefficient in the weakest investor 
protection deciles (D1) that becomes negative in the strongest (D10). This sign reversal is expected 
and reflects the premium associated with stocks in weak minority shareholder protection environments 
that is absent for stocks in strong investor protection environments. Given our new metric is the 
product of free float (inverse of block holding) and institutional quality, this is at its highest values 
when block holding is minimal (i.e. fully diversified ownership) and where institutional quality is high. 
So the negative coefficients infer a progressive trend towards a discount on a “dispersed ownership” 
governance model within high institutional quality contexts (i.e. that of Berle and Means (1932) and 
with optimal protection of the institutional environment that supports a third party contracting and 
external governance model. In such high institutional quality contexts, third party contracting is 
supported and minority shareholder rights are better enforced and protected. Therefore, uncertainties 
about the true intentions of block shareholders (e.g. from their elevated potential for expropriation) are 
mitigated. The presence of a premium in lower “Investor protection” deciles represents both weakness 
in the external contracting environment and higher uncertainties with respect to block holder intentions 
regarding appropriation, which occur within governance structures dominated by large block entities. 
 The last two columns of Table 4 show the results of the estimation of the various pricing 
models to the zero-cost portfolios formed from the returns difference between low investor protection 
                                                 
7 One caveat is that the sample includes developed and emerging markets and this may be problematic where there is 
inactive trading (Dimson, 1979: Dimson and Marsh, 1983). Their proposed trading inactivity correction is noted but not 
used here in favour of the recent literature such as Liu (2006), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). A further limitation to the use 
of standard OLS time series has been noted in the recent literature on CAPM beta instability that results from structural 
breaks in the underlying data generating process (see Bollerslev and Zhang, 2003; Braun et al, 1995; Lettau and Ledvigson, 
2001). Thus, we also examine time-varying parameter CAPM models explained in the next section. 
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(D1) and high investor protection (D10) portfolios. This is the returns generated from a strategy of 
buying stocks in low investor protection firms and selling those where shareholder rights are protected. 
Estimation results for the CAPM, FF3F, Carhart 4F and Liquidity 2F models show the regression 
alpha can be viewed as the abnormal return that cannot be attributed to any of the included FMPs. 
Gompers et al (2003) describe these as “…the return in excess of what could have been achieved by 
passive investments in any of the factors” (p. 122). 
Following Gompers, we include both equal and value-weighted returns difference portfolios 
(see the final two columns). For the World overall universe (panel 1) we find a persistent abnormal 
return in terms of a statistically significant alpha (p < 0.05) in all models applied to the value-weighted 
difference portfolio. This abnormal return ranges from +0.4 basis points per month in the CAPM to -
0.8 basis points per month in the Liquidity 2F model. However, evidence to support an abnormal 
return attributable to investor protection is not so clear in the equal-weighted portfolio. Here, the alpha 
in the FF3F model and the Liquidity 2F model are statistically significant (p < 0.05), while in the 
CAPM and the Carhart 4F model it is statistically insignificant. This suggests that for these models, the 
investment styles are sufficient to capture differences in the cross section. This mixed evidence is also 
found in the US only universe (panel 4) where the alphas associated with value-weighted difference 
portfolios and the CAPM and Liquidity 2F model are statistically significant (p < 0.05). However, the 
alphas in the FF3F and Carhart 4F model are not statistically significant. Similarly, with respect to the 
equal weighted difference portfolio, the alphas associated with FF3F and Carhart 4F models are 
statistically significant (p < 0.05) whereas alphas in the CAPM and Liquidity 2F models are not. 
However it should be noted that the variance of value-weighted portfolios is largely reflective of a 
handful of large stocks that overwhelmingly dominate the portfolio simply because of their relative 
size. In contrast, equal-weighted portfolios variances are more reflective of the broader cross section of 
stocks constituent to the portfolio. 
 Finally, the strongest support for the investor protection FMP and the two-factor model is 
found when comparing the developed and emerging universes (Panels 2 and 3 respectively). In Panel 
2, all alphas for all models, across both equal and value weighted returns difference portfolios, are 
statistically significant (p < 0.01), with abnormal returns ranging from -0.3 basis points to -0.8 basis 
points per month. However, in Panel 3, all alphas are statistically insignificant. This reflects the 
limitation of the new Investor Protection 2F model in universes where its applicability is contingent on 
a genuine diversification of ownership types, as in developed economy compared to emerging 
economy universes that are largely dominated by ownership types that accentuate control rights in 
excess of cash flow rights. 
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In summary the evidence so far points to the maintenance of proposition 1 that a premium 
exists for investor protection, where this is defined as the product of state institutional quality and 
proportion of free float. However, the evidence from the statistical significance of alphas and the 
explanatory power (adjusted-R2) of models is more varied across the different universes. This implies 
weaker support for proposition 2 where other FMPs such as the size (SMB) and book-to-market 
(HML) and particularly Liquidity 2F (LIQ) are equally as good as Investor Protection 2F (IP) in 
explaining the cross section of stock returns. LIQ in particular is often equally as robust in explaining 
the cross section of stock returns as our IP measure. However, this is likely to be due to a large overlap 
in the nature of transactions costs captured by both measures. This limitation underscores the 
importance of considering the specific type of blockholder rather than simply a generic designation of 
block ownership that typically assumes cash flow ownership concentration. Consideration of 
ownership types is reported in Appendix D, Table 1D, together with some observations. One notable 
observation is the negligible presence of cross-shareholder networks as an ownership category in US 
stocks, while at the same time it is dominant across all deciles in the Emerging Markets universe. In 
contrast, within developed and overall universes, cross-shareholding networks tend to be concentrated 
in low investor protection deciles. This can explain the relative weakness of models in an Emerging 
Market context in contrast to all other universes. 
Table 4 
 
5.2 Time varying parameter empirical evidence 
The final set of asset pricing tests is for the Kalman filter time-varying parameter coefficient models. 
We apply the Kalman filter estimation, which relies on the notion of state space to estimate the 
conditional constant term and market beta of the investor protection augmented CAPM, as well as of 
the comparison models8. The Kalman filter estimation allows the relaxation of assumptions on data 
generating processes and a stochastic time trend accounts for structural breaks. This is preferred to 
formal switching-regression models as it is not necessary to define the exact point of the switch. This 
is particularly important in the present study as although the timing of changes is known, the exact date 
of implementation is not, particularly with respect to changes in formal institutions and regulatory 
environments. A further benefit of Kalman filter estimation is that it is less demanding of the data 
compared with Markov-switching models that are generally incompatible with short sample periods 
(see Grout and Zalewska, 2006). The process consists of an observation equation and a transition or 
                                                 
8Applications of this method include Grout and Zalewska (2006), who examine the effects of regulation on UK and US 
stocks, and Brooks et al. (1998) who investigate Australian industry portfolios. This approach is appropriate to the 
measurement of time evolving risk premiums for market and investor protection factors (Grout and Zaleswska, (2006) 
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state equation, which in combination express the structure and dynamics of a time varying system. A 
state space model is specified where an observation at time t is a linear combination of a set of state 
variables that compose the state vector. The time-varying parameter coefficient models of the Investor 
Protection 2F augmented CAPM and our comparison models are outlined in Appendix C, Table 1C. 
The results are reported in Table 5. The four test assets are the ten size and book-to-market 
decile portfolios, the ten decile investor protection sorted portfolios and a collection of equally-
weighted individual market portfolios that form each of the four universes. These provide a diverse 
range of test assets to assess the efficiency of our models. 
 In general, maximum likelihood statistical convergence is achieved on average for 60% of the 
five models applied to the four sets of test assets in each universe. Model selection is based on two sets 
of statistics: information criteria (Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion, SBC; Hannan-Quinn Criterion, HQC; 
and Akaike Information Criterion, AIC), and the time series profile of the alpha across models.  
 Panel 1 (World overall universe) shows that the Investor Protection 2F model has the lowest 
values for decile size and investor protection test assets and outperforms all other models in terms of 
the three information criteria. However, the FF3F model is preferred in decile book-to-market test 
assets, while the Carhart 4F model is preferred in country portfolios. In the developed markets 
universe (panel 2) asset pricing tests using decile book-to-market and investor protection test assets 
favour the Investor Protection 2F model, while both decile size and country test assets favour the 
Carhart 4F model. In the emerging markets universe (panel 3) the FF3F model is favoured over decile 
size, book-to-market and investor protection test assets while the Liquidity 2F model is only superior 
in the country portfolios context. Finally, in the US only universe (panel 4) the Carhart 4F model is 
superior across all test assets, with the exception of the investor protection deciles where the Investor 
Protection 2F model is optimal. 
 In summary, these time-varying parameter results provide support for the efficiency of the 
Investor Protection 2F model across the overall and developed market universes and a range of test 
assets. This is supportive of both propositions 1 and 2. However, there is no support in the emerging 
markets universe context. In the US only universe there is considerable support for the Carhart 4F 
model, similar to the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Lesmond et al (2004), although the 
latter questions the benefits of momentum as a factor because transactions costs in the market inhibit 
such a strategy in practice. This implies that consideration of the context of ownership types prevalent 
to different universes is an important and hitherto overlooked issue in the majority of the asset pricing 
literature (see Appendix D, Table 1D). It is noted that in the investor protection decile test assets the 
alpha is smallest and the share of standard errors that are below zero are highest for the Investor 
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Protection 2F model. This provides some evidence of the benefits of the investor protection FMP in 
explaining the cross section of stock returns, even though in this single country setting the factor is 
solely related to the degree of controlling block shareholding. 
Table 5 
 
6. Robustness Tests. 
We test the robustness of our results by considering another proxy for institutional quality, namely the 
Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights Index of Gwartney and Lawson (2007) - thereafter 
GL9. This index captures the dimensions of institutional quality that relate specifically to protection 
and enforcement of property rights associated with economic and financial stakeholders and 
particularly those associated with minority outside investors. We re-estimate all our main models using 
the GL index.10 The results are not reported here but are available online.11 The evidence provides 
even stronger support for our main analysis that used the broader Kaufman et al (2009) World 
Governance index. 
We first calculate the FMP summary statistics for the aggregate World market universe, and 
provide details of the nationality of stocks sorted into each of the decile IP portfolios over time.12 The 
distribution of stocks is on the whole similar to our main results in Table 3, providing reassurance for 
the robustness of our stock sorting process and models, with one difference. There is a much less 
sharply defined division between “Developed” and “Emerging” countries as evidenced by the 
relatively even dispersion of Scandinavian stocks across all ten IP decile portfolios, and the more even 
dispersion of stocks in both developed and emerging categories across all ten decile portfolios when 
using the GL index. This contrasts with the more polarized dispersion evident from using the Kaufman 
World Governance index in our main analysis. 
 We then present the estimation results from the time invariant CAPM, FF3F, Carhart 4F, 
Liquidity 2F and our Investor Protection 2F models, for each of the three universes, namely world 
overall, world developed and world emerging markets.13 These universes are those susceptible to 
institutional change and differences between national institutional frameworks that is picked up in our 
IP measure. The US only universe is the same as in our main results as being a single country the IP 
measure in effect becomes a metric built on proportion free-float capitalization of stocks. The results 
provide substantial support for those obtained in our main analysis when using the Kaufman World 
                                                 
9 We are grateful to the anonymous referee for suggesting this alternative proxy for institutional quality. 
10 Index values can be obtained from the authors’ website: http://www.freetheworld.com/ 
11 The tables can be accessed in Appendix E of the SSRN version of the paper. 
12 see Appendix E, Table 1E on the online version. 
13 See Appendix E, Table 2E on the online version. 
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Governance index. In particular, there is consistent support in all three universes, including the 
Emerging Markets universe and confirms the superiority of our new IP2F model over comparable 
FF3F, Carhart 4F and Liquidity 2F configurations. This is evident in terms of higher adjusted R2 and 
low regression Jensen alphas in both in terms absolute size and negligible statistical significance. 
However, the strongest support for our new IP measure is in the farthest two right hand columns that 
outline the results from testing all other factor models that explain the variance of equal and value 
weighted IP portfolios. In all cases the regression Jensen alphas are large and statistically significant. 
 Results from the application of time varying parameter models also provide further significant 
support for our IP2F model.14 Here the IP2F model outperforms all other time-varying parameter 
models (based on CAPM, FF3F, Carhart 4F, Liquidity 2F and IP2F) in terms of informational criteria 
(SBC, AIC, HQC). This is also substantiated by the high proportions of models that attain maximum 
likelihood convergence, for example, over 70% for our new IP2F model. These time varying results 
are notably better than those reported in Table 5 of the main analysis. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The level of protection given to minority investors is a critical factor in the determination of agency 
costs within the firm and emphasises the size, scale and development of external capital markets. The 
welfare of minority investors can be affected by both the quality of the institutional environment and 
the groups of insiders within the firm. Insiders range from managerial agents in the traditional Berle 
and Means (1932) model of ownership diversification to large controlling block holders. Thus, the 
ownership structures of firms can vary from a model of dispersed shareholdings to one of block 
holders that exercise their control by enhanced voting rights with respect to cash flow entitlements. 
 We propose a new governance measure of investor protection that is the product of national 
institutional quality and the proportion of free float shares to capture the impact of controlling block 
holders. Extensive tests of variants of the augmented-CAPM, including time-varying parameter 
Kalman filter methods, show that a two factor CAPM augmented with a factor mimicking portfolio 
based on our new investor protection metric yields the highest explanatory power for a cross section of 
stock returns. This is particularly the case in markets that exhibit a true variation in ownership types, 
that is, a combination of dispersed shareholdings and control and controlling block holder structures 
such as pyramids and cross-shareholding networks. This two-factor CAPM based on this new investor 
protection metric performs well in the overall and developed market universes, and to a lesser extent, 
the US only market universe. However, it lacks strength in emerging markets where there is little 
                                                 
14 See Appendix E, Table 3E on the online version. 
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variation in ownership type due to the dominance of pyramids and cross-shareholding networks across 
all levels of investor protection. This evidence supports our initial propositions. Differences in investor 
protection impact on investor welfare and this is particularly prevalent in markets characterised by 
marked variation in ownership and control structures. Thus, in this context our new measure and its 
associated pricing model work well where there is a genuine range in the mechanisms designed to 
effect the separation of ownership from control, where this may result from dispersed shareholdings or 
accentuated control structures such as pyramids and cross-shareholding networks. 
 In general, our results indicate variations in abnormal returns on portfolios that reflect returns 
differences between low and high investor protection sorted deciles not explained by existing 
augmented CAPMs. These abnormal returns range from 0.4 basis points per month (4.91% per annum) 
for equal weighted to over -0.8 basis points per month (-10% per annum) for value weighted 
portfolios. This confirms the importance of differences in investor protection in multi-country studies, 
particularly those drawn from developed countries. This is important to minority investors that seek a 
premium to compensate for potential welfare losses and a means of hedging these losses within a 
conventional asset pricing framework. 
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Table 1 Summary of ownership, free float and investor protection statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the sample markets.  The start date reflects beginning of data reporting for stocks in each market in Datastream, the number is the stocks in the 
respective blue chip index used.  National blue chip indices and their Datastream codes are in Appendix B Table 1B.  Datastream reports the free float proportions (%).  Institutional 
quality is reported on a 0-1 scale, where this is the average of the rescaled six underlying World Governance indicators (Democratic voice and accountability; Political stability and 
absence from violence; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory quality; Rule of law; and Control of corruption).  Indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2009) "Governance Matters VIII: 
Governance Indicators for 1996-2008". World Bank Policy Research June 2009. These are downloadable from http://www.govindicators.org.  The new investor protection metric is 
based on a stock-by-stock basis and is the product of free float proportion and country-level aggregate institutional quality, in units of 0 – 10,000.  Descriptive statistics for trading and 
liquidity measures use Datastream for the daily prices, volume, market capitalization and free float information.  Monthly returns are the average returns of each stock over a monthly 
interval.  Market capitalization is measured at 1 January for each country and is the equity market value for each firm in billions of US$.  The US$ market capitalization is measured at 
the end of month exchange rate for each country and each month.  The book to market value ratio is the inverse of the Datastream price-to-book value, for each stock.  Momentum is the 
time series average of the percentage cumulative return for each stock over the prior six months, omitting the most recent month, and is monthly, following Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993).  The Liu (1 year) metric is the liquidity measure of Liu (2006) estimated over a prior 1 year ranking period.  Square brackets indicate median values.  Developed and emerging 
markets are distinguished using the MSCI classification system.  This is reported in Appendix A Table 2A. 
 
Country Start 
date 
No. 
stock 
 Investor protection metrics  Trading and liquidity descriptive statistics 
 Investor 
Protection 
(0 – 10,000) 
Institutional 
quality 
(0 - 1) 
Free-Float 
(%) 
 Monthly 
returns (%) 
Market 
Cap. (US$, 
billions) 
Book to 
Market 
Ratio 
Momentum 
(%) 
Liu (1 year) 
North America             
Canada 2001/01 251  7,196.34 [7,879.87] 0.9128 78.91 [87.00]  2.22 [1.72] 3.96 [1.23] 0.85 [0.56] 13.46 [6.07] 18.16 [9.61] 
US Nasdaq 100 2001/01 103  5,760.83 [7,055.84] 0.8401 68.45 [84.00]  1.85 [1.61] 20.34 [6.92] 0.35 [0.25] 28.89 [7.13] 11.81 [8.68] 
US S&P 500 2001/01 502  6,032.95 [6,876.88] 0.8401 72.02 [82.08]  1.44 [1.42] 26.73 [8.56] 0.46 [0.36] 8.09 [6.46] 13.63 [8.68] 
Europe Developed             
France 2001/01 60  5,722.79 [6,044.13] 0.8200 69.47 [73.50]  1.00 [0.93] 20.40 [9.52] 0.66 [0.55] 5.35 [5.02]  7.16 [5.79]  
Germany 2001/01 100  4,875.71 [5,351.92] 0.8803 55.31 [59.00]  0.86 [0.32] 10.44 [2.68] 2.29 [0.55] 4.67 [2.35] 20.80 [6.76]  
Austria 2001/01 53  3,962.46 [3,686.39] 0.9041 43.69 [40.00]  0.79 [0.35] 1.41 [0.55] 1.67 [0.63] 4.58 [1.98] 43.45 [13.46] 
Belgium 2001/01 137  4,398.75 [4,144.46] 0.8464 51.99 [49.50]  1.18 [0.55] 5.06 [0.24] 1.01 [0.79] 5.39 [2.92] 42.92 [5.79] 
Ireland 2001/01 47  6,054.88 [6,166.87] 0.8837 68.15 [68.95]  1.58 [0.74] 2.69 [0.30] 0.87 [0.55] 10.12 [5.38] 76.92 [18.27] 
Italy 2001/01 74  2,949.45 [2,722.45] 0.6819 43.11 [40.50]  0.70 [0.28] 0.30 [0.14] 0.69 [0.67] 4.42 [1.58] 16.92 [7.72] 
Netherlands 2001/01 140  5,575.54 [5,758.56] 0.9349 59.62 [63.00]  0.73 [0.33] 4.01 [0.34] 2.09 [0.54] 4.01 [0.90] 30.17 [5.79] 
Portugal 2001/01 47  3,104.99 [2,891.18] 0.7846 39.45 [37.00]  0.57 [-0.15] 1.36 [0.20] 0.84 [0.65] 2.83 [-0.29] 35.86 [5.79] 
Spain 2001/01 108  4,144.68 [3,638.23] 0.7688 53.84 [50.00]  0.99 [0.91] 5.64 [0.80] 0.71 [0.61] 6.32 [5.67] 17.76 [6.78] 
Switzerland 2001/01 100  6,084.24 [6,357.71]  0.9425 64.65 [68.00]  1.29 [1.13] 7.94 [1.76] 0.67 [0.51] 7.84 [6.47] 13.55 [9.61] 
UK 2001/01 101  3,742.75 [4,764.91] 0.8745 71.48 [87.33]  1.21 [1.28] 25.77 [9.12] 0.54 [0.42] 12.23 [6.41] 10.34 [7.72] 
Scandinavia             
Denmark 2001/01 150  5,771.32 [5,889.03] 0.9638 59.69 [60.00]  1.19 [0.56] 0.97 [0.07] 0.99 [0.91] 7.14 [5.63] 65.41 [22.20] 
Finland 2001/01 131  5,930.01 [6,267.42] 0.9760 60.61 [65.00]  1.01 [0.54] 1.99 [0.22] 0.73 [0.64] 4.63 [3.33] 35.95 [10.62] 
Norway 2001/01 18  7,689.36 [7,873.21] 0.9335 82.13 [84.00]  1.01 [1.31] 0.11 [0.04] 1.20 [0.97] 3.65 [3.35] 101.68 [100.41] 
Sweden 2001/01 71  6,708.69 [7,094.88] 0.9480 70.73 [75.50]  1.63 [1.40] 8.52 [2.12] 0.68 [0.56] 9.97 [6.10] 14.34 [9.65] 
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Country Start 
date 
No. 
stock 
 Investor protection metrics  Trading and liquidity descriptive statistics 
 Investor 
Protection 
(0 – 10,000) 
Institutional 
quality 
(0 - 1) 
Free-Float 
(%) 
 Monthly 
returns (%) 
Market 
Cap. (US$, 
billions) 
Book to 
Market 
Ratio 
Momentum 
(%) 
Liu (1 year) 
Europe Emerging             
Czech Rep. 2001/01 24  2,667.19 [2,314.77] 0.7257 36.71 [31.00]  1.56 [0.63] 2.84 [0.39] 1.32 [1.01] 9.22 [5.70] 62.87 [9.69] 
Hungary 2001/01 14  4,080.88 [4,235.15] 0.7282 55.41 [56.00]  0.66 [0.00] 1.68 [0.17]  0.94 [0.95] 4.52 [1.53] 17.35 [10.66] 
Poland 2001/01 20  3,511.79 [3,402.60] 0.6930 50.95 [50.00]  1.89 [1.50] 4.23 [3.25] 0.71 [0.64] 11.86 [6.71] 20.03 [9.65] 
Russia MICEX 2001/01 50  1,810.61 [1,822.76] 0.3665 48.89 [45.50]  2.53 [2.41] 10.72 [2.63] 1.11 [0.81] 17.34 [8.80] 40.50 [13.94] 
Russia RTS 2001/01 50  1,811.80 [1,822.76] 0.3665 48.92 [45.50]  2.53 [2.41] 10.70 [2.68] 1.10 [0.80] 17.31 [8.80] 40.50 [13.94] 
Greece 2001/01 60  3,668.95 [3,528.02] 0.6697 53.69 [48.50]  0.40 [-0.24] 2.59 [0.25] 1.12 [0.77] 3.37 [-1.91] 16.51 [10.62] 
MEA Developed             
Israel 2001/01 101  2,906.21 [2,466.07] 0.6744 43.30 [36.50]  1.62 [0.81] 1.14 [0.30] 0.78 [0.67] 9.30 [3.87] 35.76 [15.44] 
MEA Emerging             
Egypt 2001/01 43  1,879.35 [1,709.68]  0.4100 45.32 [40.50]  2.35 [0.00] 0.60 [0.26] 1.06 [0.67] 17.98 [0.00] 48.88 [18.41] 
South Africa 2001/01 42  3,703.93 [4,236.71] 0.6113 59.67 [69.52]  1.66 [1.16] 9.72 [4.18] 0.46 [0.42] 8.94 [7.32] 16.49 [10.62] 
Qatar 2005/01 35  4,375.73 [5,007.71] 0.6559 65.16 [73.50]  2.28 [0.51] 2.19 [0.71] 0.62 [0.52] 11.33 [4.52] 41.57 [11.58] 
Turkey 2001/01 100  2,036.32 [1,835.36] 0.5148 39.40 [35.00]  1.94 [1.06] 1.13 [0.18] 0.96 [0.73] 9.96 [5.25] 13.77 [9.65] 
UAE (Abu Dhabi) 2004/01 50  3,288.92 [3,110.53] 0.6484 50.55 [48.00]  2.01 [0.15] 1.98 [0.73] 0.88 [0.68] 13.08 [3.60] 91.03 [23.08] 
UAE (Dubai) 2004/01 57  3,313.85 [3,249.09] 0.6484 50.78 [50.50]  2.06 [0.00] 1.40 [0.31] 0.88 [0.75] 14.34 [0.00] 115.37 [71.44] 
Australasia             
Australia 2001/01 200  6,482.94 [6,812.24] 0.9093 71.18 [76.92]  2.08 [2.09] 4.61 [1.29] 0.63 [0.55] 13.81 [5.91] 19.84 [7.72] 
New Zealand 2001/01 50  6,536.82 [6,983.26] 0.9468 68.91 [75.00]  1.67 [1.43] 2.69 [0.43] 0.70 [0.66] 8.51 [7.14] 26.63 [9.65] 
Asia Developed             
Japan 2001/01 150  6,850.25 [7,419.83] 0.8082 84.60 [90.25]  0.67 [0.05] 12.92 [8.01] 0.72 [0.65] 3.43 [0.09] 15.66 [14.53] 
Singapore 2001/01 183  4,376.33 [3,929.16] 0.8770 49.95 [45.00]  1.58 [0.46] 1.52 [0.22] 1.02 [0.84] 9.82 [3.10] 39.20 [11.58] 
Hong Kong 2001/01 200  4,194.32 [4,082.58] 0.8489 49.01 [47.00]  1.93 [0.36] 69.76 [0.62] 1.29 [0.94] 12.84 [0.23] 33.25 [14.53] 
Asia Emerging             
China (Shanghai) 2001/01 180  1,966.62 [1,868.35] 0.4079 47.87 [46.00]  1.78 [0.53] 5.36 [0.55] 0.39 [0.33] 11.53 [0.00] 34.09 [21.24] 
China (Shenzhen) 2001/01 100  2,122.45 [2,015.14] 0.4079 51.78 [50.00]  2.11 [1.08] 1.63 [0.71] 0.38 [0.36] 13.91 [0.00] 33.12 [21.64] 
India (Bombay) 2001/01 100  2,766.40 [3,459.25] 0.4786 57.18 [72.00]  2.51 [1.59] 4.28 [1.66] 0.68 [0.46] 16.23 [8.48] 16.29 [11.58] 
Indonesia 2001/01 45  1,550.49 [1,510.01] 0.3983 38.57 [35.00]  2.42 [0.00] 3.75 [0.70] 0.72 [0.38] 13.94 [5.88]  36.05 [17.44] 
Malaysia 2001/01 102  3,288.17 [3,038.40] 0.6140 52.84 [48.05]  1.03 [0.36] 1.48 [0.32] 0.83 [0.92] 4.40 [1.52] 23.29 [14.53] 
Philippines 2001/01 30  1,722.02 [1,491.18] 0.4373 39.38 [34.00]  2.17 [1.28] 2.69 [0.76]  1.14 [0.64] 15.08 [8.25] 42.22 [16.41] 
South Korea 2001/01 100  4,417.40 [4,495.76] 0.6980 63.04 [64.00]  2.11 [0.00] 5.71 [2.82]  1.14 [0.91] 12.49 [7.54] 16.70 [12.55] 
Taiwan 2001/01 100  5,577.43 [5,869.43]  0.7396 75.16 [78.00]  2.72 [0.42] 3.26 [1.20] 0.74 [0.65] 7.58 [3.57] 15.80 [12.60] 
Thailand 2001/01 100  2,893.84 [2,844.15] 0.5136 56.26 [58.00]  2.53 [1.17] 1.43 [0.34] 0.30 [0.63] 15.99 [3.95] 23.86 [15.44]  
Latin America             
Brazil 2001/01 99  3,126.90 [3,053.76] 0.5453 57.22 [56.02]  2.25 [1.17] 4.53 [1.15] 0.90 [0.61] 13.67 [7.24] 35.72 [12.55]  
Chile 2001/01 40  2,875.46 [2,917.49] 0.8088 35.41 [35.18]  1.39 [0.45]  2.94 [1.34] 0.99 [0.59] 7.68 [0.22] 31.35 [11.63] 
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Country Start 
date 
No. 
stock 
 Investor protection metrics  Trading and liquidity descriptive statistics 
 Investor 
Protection 
(0 – 10,000) 
Institutional 
quality 
(0 - 1) 
Free-Float 
(%) 
 Monthly 
returns (%) 
Market 
Cap. (US$, 
billions) 
Book to 
Market 
Ratio 
Momentum 
(%) 
Liu (1 year) 
Colombia 2001/01 63  1,680.02 [1,433.91] 0.4310 38.99 [32.00]  2.55 [0.00] 13.77 [0.23] 3.55 [1.05] 13.12 [0.95] 137.94 [131.77] 
Mexico 2001/01 60  3,078.55 [3,925.20] 0.5167 59.23 [74.00]  1.89 [1.45] 3.18 [0.98] 1.11 [0.62] 11.95 [5.78] 49.27 [9.65] 
Peru 2001/01 15  2,212.82 [2,484.94]  0.4649 47.71 [54.00]  2.28 [0.56] 1.38 [0.36] 1.79 [0.66] 16.62 [7.00] 44.24 [18.41] 
             
MSCI Developed  3077  5,456.63 [6,039.94] 0.8678 63.61 [71.25]  1.35 [0.99] 12.32 [1.46] 0.87 [0.56] 3.48 [0.48] 30.49 [9.65]  
US only  605  6,011.84 [6,850.84] 0.5579 71.77 [82.00]  1.54 [1.44] 25.86 [8.51] 0.44 [0.34] 10.95 [6.83] 14.48 [8.68] 
MSCI Emerging  1679  2,868.91 [2,603.97] 0.7182 51.35 [49.00]  1.76 [0.62] 4.62 [1.02] 0.82 [0.58] 10.43 [3.09] 40.35 [14.48] 
Overall  4756  4,565.64 [4,621.74] 0.9128 59.41 [63.06]  1.49 [0.88] 9.61 [1.23] 0.85 [0.56] 9.43 [4.34] 33.97 [11.58] 
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Table 2 Factor mimicking portfolio summary statistics – for aggregate World market universe 
This table reports the descriptive statistics, autocorrelations (at 1, 6 and 12 lags) for returns-based valuation factors including the Market, the Fama and French (1993) size (SMB) 
and book to market value (HML), the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum factor and the Liu (2006) liquidity factor used to explain cross section of stock returns across the 
market universe.  The market universe in this case is the aggregate world and is equal-weighted.  All factors are obtained from equal-weighted portfolios while the FF size (SMB) 
and book-to-market value (HML) factors are value-weighted.  Summary statistics are also reported, with t-difference in means, for the highest and lowest liquidity sorted portfolios 
(used to create the liquidity-based valuation factor).  These are based on stock returns, book-to-market value, size (market capitalization US$), stock price, traded volume, monthly 
bid-ask spread and monthly percentage daily volatility in daily stock returns.  Liquidity portfolios D1 and D10 are formed from annual rebalancing.  †, *, ** indicates significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively 
Panel 1: Descriptive statistics Market SMB HML Liquidity 
(1 year) 
Liquidity 
(1 Month) 
Momentum Investor 
Protection 
(1 year) 
Investor 
Protection 
(1 Month) 
 Equal weight Value weight Value weight Equal weight Equal weight Equal weight Equal weight Equal weight 
         
Mean (%) 1.213% -2.388% -0.502% 1.012% 1.039% 0.790% 0.277% 0.248% 
t-statistic 2.85 -7.14 -1.73 3.73 3.84 1.83 2.36 2.28 
Standard Deviation (%) 5.446% 4.279% 3.687% 3.469% 3.463% 5.546% 2.592% 2.574% 
Skewness -0.88 -0.04 0.35 -0.39 -0.43 -2.01 0.01 -0.01 
Kurtosis 6.77 4.13 9.12 3.80 3.88 10.47 2.55 2.44 
Jarque-Bera statistic 118.09 (0) 8.80 (0) 259.12 (0) 8.51 (0) 10.34 (0) 491.78 (0) 1.39 (0) 2.18 (0) 
Number of months 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 
         
Panel 2: Pearson correlations         
Market 1.0000        
SMB -0.2206** 1.0000       
HML (Book to Market value) -0.3307** -0.0414 1.0000      
Liquidity (1 Year Rebalance) -0.5332** -0.3104** 0.2681** 1.0000     
Liquidity (1 Month Rebalance) -0.5671** -0.2661** 0.2696** 0.9780** 1.0000    
Momentum -0.3273** -0.2075** 0.0008 0.4674** 0.4673** 1.0000   
Investor Protection (1 Year Rebalance) -0.3290** -0.1521* 0.2308** 0.5208** 0.5406** 0.1347* 1.0000  
Investor Protection (1 Month Rebalance) -0.3035** -0.1530* 0.2257** 0.5047** 0.5223** 0.1320* 0.9944** 1.0000 
         
Panel 3: Autocorrelations         
1-Lag 0.271 0.140 0.098 -0.002 -0.007 0.310 0.048 0.069 
6-Lags -0.101 -0.142 -0.012 0.006 0.010 -0.028 -0.087 -0.089 
12-Lags -0.019 -0.046 0.140 0.076 0.097 0.016 0.071 0.081 
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Table 3 Factor mimicking portfolio summary statistics – for aggregate World market and US only universes 
This table reports the stock counts by country and ownership descriptive statistics for all ten decile sorted investor protection portfolios (D1 – D10).  The first is a breakdown of stock 
counts per portfolio with respect to legal origin of their listing market and is by German, French and Scandinavian civil code versus English common law classification, following La 
Porta et al (2008).  Developed and emerging markets are distinguished using the MSCI classification system.  The second reports the descriptive statistics for all ten decile sorted 
investor protection portfolios (D1 – D10), with panel 1 for the World overall and panel 2 for the US-only universes.  These show summary statistics for several stock-characteristic 
variables per decile-sorted portfolio.  These are returns (equally and value weighted decile portfolios), momentum, the Liu-liquidity metric, market capitalization (US$ billions), 
traded volume (US$ millions), the monthly proportion of daily zero returns (%), mean daily stock closing price (US$), Book-to-market value, free float proportion (%) and the 
investor protection metric.  In the first column a t-difference in means statistical significance confidence level is provided for mean values in decile portfolio D1 in relation to the 
differences between these and D10.  †, *, ** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 D1 (Low) D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 (High) 
Panel 1: Stock count (#) – World market 
universe 
          
English common law 82.87 126.62 143.20 168.60 189.93 199.30 193.65 203.08 191.90 192.84 
French civil code law 160.07 111.86 115.29 108.07 90.44 68.20 68.46 47.70 45.66 72.83 
German civil code law 97.55 91.66 70.03 59.45 54.92 61.73 63.16 78.97 98.15 26.49 
Scandinavian civil code law 7.61 10.49 13.41 23.23 26.68 31.17 39.02 40.59 39.32 85.63 
           
English common law - Developed 34.70 83.09 100.57 126.43 146.26 163.74 180.99 201.40 191.90 192.84 
English common law - Emerging 48.17 43.53 42.63 42.17 43.68 35.56 12.66 1.68 0.00 0.00 
           
French civil code law - Developed 34.39 52.30 68.68 68.73 66.35 52.54 58.24 47.70 45.22 72.61 
French civil code law - Emerging 125.68 59.56 46.62 39.34 24.09 15.66 10.21 0.00 0.44 0.22 
           
German civil code law - Developed 26.68 7.76 10.90 17.23 18.88 18.41 23.41 46.59 91.12 26.49 
German civil code law - Emerging 70.87 83.91 59.13 42.22 36.04 43.32 39.75 32.38 7.02 0.00 
           
North America 3.21 18.17 28.73 45.80 50.10 65.70 115.97 145.66 151.33 118.82 
Europe Developed 54.88 61.45 85.41 86.28 91.13 83.34 60.31 51.02 46.76 68.78 
Scandinavia 7.61 10.49 13.41 23.23 26.68 31.17 39.02 40.59 39.32 85.63 
Europe Emerging 36.39 28.12 17.95 16.46 11.85 9.49 6.51 5.78 4.32 0.00 
Middle East & Africa Developed 17.59 19.02 11.76 9.80 6.88 5.85 4.90 2.56 0.00 0.00 
Middle East & Africa Emerging 49.30 29.66 27.96 21.29 21.55 22.56 9.00 1.10 0.00 0.00 
Australasia 1.71 2.78 5.44 7.22 14.10 16.85 26.73 28.56 25.51 55.44 
Asia Developed 9.78 33.09 39.87 52.93 56.43 50.58 40.49 54.10 89.59 15.41 
Asia Emerging 130.54 133.38 101.21 77.90 65.33 65.37 51.26 35.38 6.44 0.00 
Latin America 37.57 17.66 22.20 15.05 11.37 9.80 4.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
           
MSCI Developed 103.38 153.63 193.57 235.63 258.16 265.86 301.67 336.27 367.55 377.57 
MSCI Emerging 278.30 213.09 176.05 137.58 114.01 108.00 72.30 38.24 7.46 0.22 
           
Total 387.27 378.46 378.52 378.67 378.73 378.64 378.66 378.53 378.75 377.79 
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Panel 2: Summary statistics – World market 
universe 
D1 (Low) D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 
(High) 
 Equal Equal Equal Equal Equal Equal Equal Equal Equal Equal 
Returns – equal weight, % 1.73* 1.73 1.69 1.52 1.60 1.53 1.47 1.44 1.33 1.45 
Returns – value weight, % 1.37† 1.11 1.13 0.70 0.98 0.77 0.64 0.42 0.80 0.72 
           
Investor Protection metric 1,121.41** 2,103.50 2,775.06 3,463.22 4,221.33 4,981.82 5,856.35 6,681.22 7,408.91 8,347.75 
Free Float (%) 22.62** 37.43 44.87 50.87 57.89 66.64 72.05 79.04 86.18 89.70 
           
Momentum 0.1085* 0.1090 0.1119 0.0941 0.0988 0.0913 0.0856 0.0894 0.0736 0.0839 
Book to Market value ratio 0.7003** 0.7435 0.8718 1.0349 0.8893 0.7753 0.7637 0.7969 0.7145 0.9729 
           
Liu Liquidity (1 year) 42.27** 28.63 27.72 24.93 21.13 19.23 18.16 15.90 16.52 20.61 
Market Cap. (US$ billions) 4.18** 3.48 4.03 4.99 6.72 10.71 12.45 22.46 16.15 9.63 
Traded volume (shares millions) 1,886.24** 142.85 120.12 131.96 88.49 91.72 79.50 85.44 105.89 48.97 
Daily zero returns per month (%) 33.42** 22.34 21.35 20.54 18.86 17.11 16.43 14.05 12.63 17.15 
Price (mean month, US$) 20.97** 16.21 19.93 24.74 41.68 37.92 37.27 43.29 40.21 73.51 
           
Panel 3: Summary statistics – US only universe D1 (Low) D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 
(High) 
Returns – equal weight (%) 1.66 1.50 1.41 1.53 1.26 1.34 1.27 1.22 1.14 1.24 
Returns – value weight (%) 1.09** 1.11 1.09 1.08 0.92 0.88 0.86 0.48 0.83 0.12 
           
Investor Protection metric 4,115.06** 4,967.98 5,354.03 5,652.81 5,923.72 6,166.08 6,384.66 6,615.00 6,859.81 7,277.17 
Free Float (%) 53.89** 62.09 66.27 69.12 72.46 74.76 76.98 79.45 81.92 85.82 
           
Momentum 0.0954† 0.0863 0.0910 0.0935 0.0748 0.0785 0.0721 0.0644 0.0629 0.0724 
Book to Market value ratio 0.4028** 0.4043 0.4139 0.4457 0.4458 0.4231 0.4368 0.4337 0.5696 0.4786 
           
Liu Liquidity (1 year) 9.13 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.19 
Market Cap. (US$ billions) 17.55** 12.36 11.79 10.55 13.58 15.37 43.83 56.65 42.38 40.05 
Traded volume (shares millions) 94.89** 91.07 83.54 89.63 85.23 106.26 160.75 172.43 207.43 182.78 
Daily zero returns per month (%) 4.56 4.57 4.52 4.55 4.54 4.45 4.55 4.62 4.60 4.90 
Price (mean month, US$) 42.17** 41.18 42.75 42.27 41.20 41.93 46.71 50.08 43.89 47.75 
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Table 4  Empirical results for 10 investor protection (1 year rank and holding period) decile portfolios – for all universes 
This table reports the beta coefficients for valuation factors with t-statistics, explanatory power (R2) and standard errors for the Fama and French (1993) three factor model (size and 
book to market value), the Carhart (1997) four factor model (size, book to market value and momentum) and the Liu (2006) two factor liquidity model of Liu (2006) in modelling 
returns of 10 liquidity sorted quintile portfolios (single-pass stock sorting following Liu, 2006).  1y indicates annual rebalancing used in factor formation (as opposed to monthly 
rebalancing).  D1 is the lowest illiquidity and D10 the highest.  These portfolios are formed from annual rebalancing using the liquidity metric.  10 year US Treasury yield is used as 
the risk free rate.  HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 5.0000).  Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics.  †, *, ** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 D1 
(Low) 
D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 
(High) 
D1 - D10 D1 - D10 
Weighting: Equal Equal Equal Equal Equal Equal Equal Equal Equal Equal Equal Value 
Panel 1: World market universe           
Panel 1A:  CAPM             
Alpha (%) 0.003 
[2.03] 
0.002 
[1.18] 
0.001 
[0.91] 
-0.001 
[-1.10] 
-0.003 
[-0.50] 
-0.001 
[-1.17] 
-0.001 
[-1.12] 
-0.001 
[-0.54] 
-0.001 
[-0.43] 
-0.002 
[-1.66] 
0.001 
[0.53] 
0.004 
[1.72]* 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.909 
[53.35] 
0.977 
[45.43] 
1.020 
[61.29] 
1.036 
[53.74] 
1.058 
[65.55] 
1.048 
[82.13] 
1.009 
[59.48] 
0.951 
[58.74] 
0.859 
[37.9] 
1.066 
[57.71] 
-0.156 
[-5.16] 
-0.093 
[-1.16] 
Adjusted R2 0.9129 0.9081 0.9591 0.9776 0.9782 0.9762 0.9661 0.9502 0.9091 0.9525 0.1020 0.0069 
             
Panel 1B:  FF3F             
Alpha (%) 0.001 
[0.32] 
0.001 
[0.22] 
0.001 
[0.55] 
-0.001 
[-1.77] 
-0.001 
[-0.88] 
-0.001 
[-1.54] 
0.001 
[0.86] 
0.001 
[0.65] 
0.001 
[0.27] 
-0.001 
[-1.36] 
-0.002 
[-1.75]* 
-0.005 
[-1.71]* 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.896 
[58.26] 
0.973 
[51.37] 
1.028 
[66.41] 
1.034 
[55.65] 
1.052 
[64.23] 
1.039 
[76.75] 
1.020 
[66.25] 
0.951 
[57.86] 
0.866 
[42.76] 
1.059 
[49.84] 
-0.161 
[-5.08] 
-0.159 
[-1.95] 
Beta: SMB -0.110 
[-3.33] 
-0.080 
[-1.65] 
-0.028 
[-0.98] 
-0.030 
[-1.91] 
-0.012 
[-0.64] 
-0.013 
[-0.62] 
0.083 
[3.39] 
0.065 
[2.28] 
0.046 
[1.33] 
0.025 
[0.68] 
-0.131 
[-1.99] 
-0.399 
[-5.07] 
Beta: HML 0.024 
[0.62] 
0.045 
[0.92] 
0.057 
[1.44] 
0.017 
[1.01] 
-0.018 
[-0.81] 
-0.027 
[-1.18] 
-0.016 
[-0.69] 
-0.048 
[-1.52] 
-0.003 
[-0.07] 
-0.052 
[-1.32] 
0.079 
[1.07] 
0.016 
[0.11] 
Adjusted R2 0.9204 0.9118 0.9604 0.9780 0.9781 0.9762 0.9699 0.9537 0.9096 0.9533 0.1534 0.1371 
             
Panel 1C:  Carhart 4F             
Alpha (%) 0.001 
[0.30] 
0.002 
[0.18] 
0.001 
[0.52] 
-0.001 
[-1.68] 
-0.001 
[-0.77] 
-0.001 
[-1.51] 
0.001 
[0.90] 
0.001 
[0.64] 
0.003 
[0.24] 
-0.002 
[-1.42] 
-0.001 
[-0.74] 
-0.005 
[-1.37] † 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.900 
[42.57] 
0.983 
[32.32] 
1.031 
[49.50] 
1.030 
[49.56] 
1.038 
[72.97] 
1.030 
[69.67] 
1.012 
[54.11] 
0.955 
[49.38] 
0.875 
[34.29] 
1.069 
[44.23] 
-0.167 
[-4.08] 
-0.104 
[-0.98] 
Beta: SMB -0.106 
[-3.11] 
-0.071 
[-1.54] 
-0.026 
[-0.82] 
-0.035 
[-1.96] 
-0.025 
[-1.21] 
-0.021 
[-0.89] 
0.076 
[2.93] 
0.069 
[2.34] 
0.054 
[1.54] 
0.034 
[0.92] 
-0.137 
[-2.05] 
-0.350 
[-3.63] 
Beta: HML 0.026 
[0.65] 
0.050 
[1.04] 
0.058 
[1.48] 
0.014 
[0.83] 
-0.025 
[-1.13] 
-0.032 
[-1.41] 
-0.021 
[-0.89] 
-0.046 
[-1.40] 
0.002 
[0.04] 
-0.047 
[-1.18] 
0.076 
[1.01] 
0.045 
[0.29] 
Beta: Momentum 0.008 0.021 0.006 -0.011 -0.031 -0.020 -0.018 0.008 0.018 0.022 -0.014 0.120 
 40 
[0.36] [0.60] [0.20] [-0.80] [-1.98] [-1.17] [-1.16] [0.41] [0.72] [0.85] [-0.32] [1.09] 
Adjusted R2 0.9199 0.9116 0.9602 0.9779 0.9786 0.9763 0.9700 0.9535 0.9094 0.9533 0.1488 0.1495 
             
Panel 1D:  Liquidity 2F(1y)             
Alpha (%) -0.001 
[-0.68] 
-0.001 
[-0.60] 
-0.001 
[-0.16] 
-0.001 
[-1.39] 
0.001 
[1.08] 
0.001 
[0.18] 
0.001 
[1.91] 
0.001 
[1.58] 
0.001 
[0.99] 
-0.003 
[-0.32] 
-0.004 
[-1.93]* 
-0.008 
[-2.71]** 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.995 
[38.93] 
1.045 
[30.82] 
1.050 
[52.07] 
1.047 
[44.28] 
1.035 
[52.45] 
1.024 
[70.87] 
0.951 
[87.17] 
0.902 
[55.31] 
0.815 
[31.85] 
1.029 
[44.83] 
-0.034 
[-0.77] 
0.204 
[3.43] 
Beta: Liquidity 0.251 
[7.48] 
0.200 
[4.52] 
0.088 
[2.43] 
0.033 
[1.14] 
-0.069 
[-2.79] 
-0.069 
[-2.58] 
-0.171 
[-6.59] 
-0.143 
[-4.13] 
-0.131 
[-2.74] 
-0.109 
[-3.25] 
0.358 
[6.58] 
0.875 
[8.64] 
Adjusted R2 0.9329 0.9186 0.9609 0.9778 0.9793 0.9773 0.9741 0.9562 0.9148 0.9551 0.2639 0.3354 
             
Panel 1E:  Investor Protection 
2F(1y) 
            
Alpha (%) 0.001 
[0.26] 
-0.001 
[-0.66] 
-0.001 
[-0.29] 
-0.001 
[-1.23] 
0.001 
[0.15] 
-0.003 
[-0.49] 
1.36E-05 
[0.02] 
0.001 
[1.13] 
0.001 
[0.86] 
0.001 
[0.26] 
-- -- -- -- 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.996 
[94.43] 
1.060 
[60.32] 
1.064 
[69.40] 
1.040 
[52.36] 
1.044 
[62.70] 
1.030 
[84.17] 
0.973 
[66.25] 
0.901 
[61.99] 
0.805 
[38.04] 
0.996 
[94.43] 
-- -- -- -- 
Beta: Investor Protect 0.555 
[25.56] 
0.530 
[10.64] 
0.280 
[8.58] 
0.024 
[0.88] 
-0.091 
[-4.13] 
-0.114 
[-3.77] 
-0.230 
[-7.99] 
-0.319 
[-9.77] 
-0.342 
[-7.74] 
-0.445 
[-20.52] 
-- -- -- -- 
Adjusted R2 0.9817 0.9621 0.9736 0.9776 0.9795 0.9784 0.9762 0.9717 0.9381 0.9861 -- -- -- -- 
             
             
Panel 2: World developed markets universe           
Panel 2A:  CAPM             
Alpha (%) 0.001 
[0.40] 
-0.001 
[-0.56] 
-0.001 
[-0.64] 
0.001 
[-0.89] 
0.001 
[-0.42] 
0.001 
[0.21] 
0.001 
[0.14] 
0.001 
[0.30] 
0.001 
[0.38] 
0.001 
[0.19] 
-0.003 
[-1.84]* 
-0.004 
[-1.50] † 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.904 
[48.45] 
1.087 
[67.29] 
1.042 
[50.59] 
1.028 
[109.97] 
1.026 
[85.61] 
0.989 
[67.43] 
0.960 
[72.42] 
0.894 
[42.96] 
0.960 
[58.89] 
1.095 
[60.61] 
-0.190 
[-7.80] 
-0.106 
[-2.10] 
Adjusted R2 0.9228 0.9571 0.9631 0.9816 0.9790 0.9666 0.9675 0.9359 0.9637 0.9606 0.1977 0.0402 
             
Panel 2B:  FF3F             
Alpha (%) -0.002 
[-1.14] 
-0.001 
[-1.19] 
-0.002 
[-1.88] 
0.001 
[-0.18] 
0.001 
[-0.10] 
0.002 
[2.34] 
0.001 
[0.98] 
0.001 
[0.61] 
0.001 
[1.41] 
-0.001 
[-0.84] 
-0.004 
[-2.44]** 
-0.008 
[-2.81]** 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.872 
[46.93] 
1.075 
[55.17] 
1.019 
[58.16] 
1.032 
[104.01] 
1.036 
[74.81] 
1.015 
[56.00] 
0.967 
[75.57] 
0.903 
[46.31] 
0.971 
[54.79] 
1.088 
[53.73] 
-0.214 
[-6.99] 
-0.153 
[-3.08] 
Beta: SMB -0.099 
[-2.91] 
-0.040 
[-1.06] 
-0.056 
[-2.15] 
0.018 
[0.99] 
0.008 
[0.49] 
0.086 
[4.12] 
0.040 
[1.73] 
0.022 
[0.70] 
0.049 
[1.87] 
-0.051 
[-1.96] 
-0.044 
[-0.82] 
-0.151 
[-2.24] 
Beta: HML -0.060 
[-1.70] 
-0.022 
[-0.63] 
-0.061 
[-2.71] 
0.002 
[0.12] 
0.040 
[1.55] 
0.039 
[1.41] 
-0.007 
[-0.47] 
0.025 
[0.78] 
0.003 
[0.15] 
0.020 
[0.67] 
-0.077 
[-1.73] 
-0.381 
[-3.65] 
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Adjusted R2 0.9294 0.9574 0.9653 0.9815 0.9793 0.9708 0.9681 0.9357 0.9646 0.9613 0.2061 0.1905 
             
Panel 2C:  Carhart 4F             
Alpha (%) -0.001 
[-1.10] 
-0.001 
[-1.05] 
-0.002 
[-1.62] 
0.001 
[-0.05] 
0.001 
[0.11] 
0.002 
[2.32] 
0.001 
[0.85] 
0.001 
[0.53] 
0.001 
[1.22] 
-0.001 
[-0.99] 
-0.004 
[-2.24]* 
-0.008 
[-2.78]** 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.861 
[42.58] 
1.046 
[42.56] 
0.994 
[47.28] 
1.020 
[99.52] 
1.011 
[56.70] 
1.021 
[52.73] 
0.988 
[69.32] 
0.922 
[38.7] 
0.995 
[51.15] 
1.119 
[59.23] 
-0.256 
[-8.00] 
-0.150 
[-3.06] 
Beta: SMB -0.107 
[-3.09] 
-0.060 
[-1.66] 
-0.073 
[-2.71] 
0.010 
[0.57] 
-0.008 
[-0.42] 
0.090 
[4.30] 
0.054 
[2.25] 
0.035 
[1.12] 
0.066 
[2.58] 
-0.030 
[-1.22] 
-0.072 
[-1.41] 
-0.151 
[-2.23] 
Beta: HML -0.066 
[-1.80] 
-0.038 
[-1.14] 
-0.075 
[-2.86] 
-0.005 
[-0.30] 
0.026 
[1.08] 
0.043 
[1.51] 
0.005 
[0.27] 
0.036 
[1.04] 
0.017 
[0.98] 
0.037 
[1.29] 
-0.101 
[-2.10] 
-0.379 
[-3.71] 
Beta: Momentum -0.020 
[-0.83] 
-0.054 
[-2.02] 
-0.047 
[-2.72] 
-0.022 
[-1.89] 
-0.046 
[-2.54] 
0.013 
[0.68] 
0.039 
[2.48] 
0.035 
[1.58] 
0.046 
[2.45] 
0.058 
[2.43] 
-0.078 
[-2.07] 
0.008 
[0.14] 
Adjusted R2 0.9292 0.9588 0.9665 0.9817 0.9806 0.9707 0.9690 0.9363 0.9660 0.963 0.2254 0.1856 
             
Panel 2D:  Liquidity 2F (1y)             
Alpha (%) -0.001 
[-0.82] 
0.001 
[-0.30] 
-0.001 
[-1.27] 
0.001 
[-0.33] 
0.001 
[0.85] 
0.001 
[1.34] 
0.001 
[1.18] 
0.001 
[0.52] 
0.001 
[1.08] 
-0.001 
[-0.49] 
-0.004 
[-2.20]* 
-0.003 
[-1.36] † 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.940 
[49.02] 
1.081 
[42.08] 
1.059 
[43.28] 
1.022 
[78.44] 
1.005 
[82.11] 
0.968 
[66.12] 
0.940 
[55.84] 
0.887 
[37.21] 
0.943 
[45.09] 
1.112 
[55.32] 
-0.172 
[-5.92] 
-0.085 
[-2.04] 
Beta: Liquidity 0.119 
[2.45] 
-0.021 
[-0.46] 
0.055 
[1.42] 
-0.021 
[-0.86] 
-0.071 
[-2.86] 
-0.07 [-
1.79] 
-0.068 
[-2.04] 
-0.022 
[-0.51] 
-0.055 
[-1.55] 
0.057 
[1.66] 
0.058 
[0.91] 
-0.034 
[-0.44] 
Adjusted R2 0.9270 0.9569 0.9636 0.9816 0.9802 0.9678 0.9687 0.9357 0.9644 0.9611 0.1982 0.0363 
             
Panel 2E:  Investor Protection 
2F (1y) 
            
Alpha (%) 0.001 
[0.43] 
-0.001 
[-0.80] 
-0.001 
[-0.73] 
0.001 
[-0.91] 
0.001 
[-0.40] 
0.001 
[0.27] 
0.001 
[0.20] 
0.001 
[0.34] 
0.001 
[0.54] 
0.001 
[0.43] 
-- -- -- -- 
Beta: Market (excess return) 1.012 
[58.51] 
1.144 
[60.28] 
1.075 
[43.05] 
1.036 
[96.11] 
1.017 
[80.14] 
0.964 
[73.42] 
0.929 
[52.40] 
0.867 
[39.12] 
0.921 
[47.33] 
1.012 
[58.51] 
-- -- -- -- 
Beta: Investor Protect 0.567 
[16.55] 
0.298 
[7.21] 
0.173 
[3.77] 
0.042 
[1.49] 
-0.046 
[-1.59] 
-0.132 
[-3.30] 
-0.167 
[-3.79] 
-0.137 
[-2.19] 
-0.204 
[-5.85] 
-0.433 
[-12.63] 
-- -- -- -- 
Adjusted R2 0.9744 0.9671 0.9667 0.9817 0.9791 0.9689 0.9715 0.9387 0.9697 0.9819 -- -- -- -- 
             
             
Panel 3: World emerging markets universe           
Panel 3A:  CAPM             
Alpha (%) 0.002 
[1.53] 
0.001 
[-0.22] 
0.001 
[0.49] 
0.001 
[0.26] 
0.001 
[0.25] 
0.002 
[1.78] 
0.001 
[0.50] 
0.001 
[0.75] 
-0.002 
[-1.21] 
-0.003 
[-1.70] 
0.002 
[0.62] 
0.001 
[-0.07] 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.905 0.980 0.989 0.944 0.933 0.979 1.035 1.066 1.058 1.017 -0.112 -0.161 
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[52.45] [35.64] [24.7] [35.07] [37.08] [67.41] [39.09] [41.05] [31.88] [30.7] [-2.56] [-2.06] 
Adjusted R2 0.9284 0.9147 0.8784 0.8817 0.9168 0.9547 0.9376 0.9014 0.8960 0.8453 0.0331 0.0346 
             
Panel 3B:  FF3F             
Alpha (%) 0.002 
[1.50] 
-0.001 
[-0.35] 
0.001 
[0.30] 
0.001 
[0.30] 
0.001 
[0.74] 
0.002 
[1.79] 
0.001 
[0.82] 
0.001 
[0.03] 
-0.004 
[-1.97] 
-0.003 
[-1.38] 
0.001 
[0.40] 
0.001 
[0.27] 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.900 
[50.81] 
0.989 
[37.29] 
0.999 
[22.59] 
0.961 
[40.73] 
0.950 
[36.22] 
0.985 
[65.92] 
1.029 
[36.63] 
1.049 
[52.46] 
1.035 
[42.20] 
0.994 
[30.13] 
-0.093 
[-2.27] 
-0.096 
[-1.05] 
Beta: SMB 0.009 
[0.35] 
-0.043 
[-0.86] 
-0.051 
[-0.76] 
-0.052 
[-1.02] 
-0.015 
[-0.35] 
-0.003 
[-0.13] 
0.036 
[1.04] 
-0.004 
[-0.06] 
0.013 
[0.27] 
0.091 
[1.69] 
-0.083 
[-1.23] 
-0.014 
[-0.12] 
Beta: HML -0.032 
[-1.39] 
0.057 
[2.05] 
0.066 
[1.52] 
0.112 
[2.71] 
0.125 
[3.46] 
0.042 
1.71] 
-0.033 
[-1.37] 
-0.125 
[-3.24] 
-0.164 
[-4.09] 
-0.150 
[-3.80] 
0.122 
[2.22] 
0.207 
[2.11] 
Adjusted R2 0.9284 0.9173 0.8816 0.8918 0.9279 0.9554 0.9384 0.9087 0.9101 0.8626 0.0721 0.0634 
             
Panel 3C:  Carhart 4F             
Alpha (%) 0.002 
[1.40] 
-0.001 
[-0.33] 
0.001 
[0.24] 
0.001 
[0.22] 
0.001 
[0.67] 
0.002 
[1.60] 
0.001 
[0.79] 
0.001 
[0.04] 
-0.003 
[-1.84] 
-0.002 
[-1.26] 
0.001 
[0.26] 
0.001 
[0.18] 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.908 
[52.37] 
0.985 
[35.72] 
1.006 
[19.60] 
0.971 
[35.11] 
0.956 
[39.25] 
0.996 
[58.02] 
1.031 
[37.09] 
1.048 
[45.9] 
1.026 
[39.17] 
0.972 
[35.98] 
-0.063 
[-1.91] 
-0.063 
[-0.82] 
Beta: SMB 0.021 
[0.86] 
-0.048 
[-1.04] 
-0.041 
[-0.69] 
-0.037 
[-0.78] 
-0.006 
[-0.14] 
0.013 
[0.58] 
0.038 
[1.11] 
-0.005 
[-0.10] 
0.001 
[-0.01] 
0.058 
[1.17] 
-0.038 
[-0.61] 
0.068 
[0.74] 
Beta: HML -0.022 
[-0.92] 
0.053 
[1.75] 
0.075 
[1.73] 
0.125 
[3.17] 
0.133 
[3.62] 
0.055 
[2.15] 
-0.031 
[-1.32] 
-0.126 
[-3.36] 
-0.175 
[-4.62] 
-0.178 
[-4.34] 
0.159 
[2.78] 
0.285 
[3.12] 
Beta: Momentum 0.034 
[1.96] 
-0.015 
[-0.44] 
0.030 
[0.63] 
0.042 
[1.07] 
0.025 
[0.69] 
0.044 
[2.77] 
0.006 
[0.20] 
-0.004 
[-0.14] 
-0.037 
[-1.43] 
-0.094 
[-3.52] 
0.127 
[3.52] 
0.264 
[4.12] 
Adjusted R2 0.9294 0.9170 0.8818 0.8931 0.9282 0.9573 0.9380 0.9082 0.9109 0.8701 0.1239 0.1831 
             
Panel 3D:  Liquidity 2F (1y)             
Alpha (%) 0.002 
[1.41] 
-0.001 
[-0.33] 
0.001 
[-0.21] 
-0.001 
[-0.56] 
0.001 
[-0.25] 
0.001 
[0.99] 
0.001 
[0.43] 
0.003 
[1.84] 
-0.002 
[-1.01] 
-0.003 
[-1.44] 
0.001 
[0.41] 
0.001 
[0.09] 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.904 
[37.09] 
0.987 
[31.27] 
1.046 
[22.25] 
0.997 
[32.95] 
0.961 
[39.24] 
1.005 
[60.1] 
1.037 
[30.91] 
0.997 
[30.85] 
1.043 
[24.60] 
0.995 
[22.29] 
-0.091 
[-1.53] 
-0.032 
[-0.28] 
Beta: Liquidity -0.001 
[-0.03] 
0.013 
[0.45] 
0.101 
[3.05] 
0.092 
[2.93] 
0.050 
[1.64] 
0.044 
[2.07] 
0.003 
[0.10] 
-0.121 
[-3.20] 
-0.025 
[-0.66] 
-0.038 
[-0.76] 
0.037 
[0.58] 
-0.130 
[-1.27] 
Adjusted R2 0.9279 0.9143 0.8831 0.8860 0.9179 0.9556 0.9372 0.9078 0.8956 0.8451 0.0296 0.0495 
             
Panel 3E:  Investor Protection 
2F (1y) 
            
Alpha (%) 0.001 
[0.52] 
-0.002 
[-0.88] 
0.001 
[-0.13] 
0.001 
[-0.30] 
0.001 
[-0.13] 
0.001 
[1.26] 
0.001 
[0.64] 
0.003 
[1.64] 
-0.001 
[-0.32] 
0.001 
[0.52] 
-- -- -- -- 
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Beta: Market (excess return) 0.938 
[78.65] 
1.006 
[34.27] 
1.019 
[22.81] 
0.966 
[34.15] 
0.946 
[40.57] 
0.988 
[71.57] 
1.031 
[37.02] 
1.036 
[41.25] 
1.020 
[32.88] 
0.938 
[78.65] 
-- -- -- -- 
Beta: Investor Protect 0.298 
[13.53] 
0.237 
[5.77] 
0.267 
[4.41] 
0.190 
[3.57] 
0.118 
[3.50] 
0.078 
[2.66] 
-0.039 
[-0.95] 
-0.266 
[-4.75] 
-0.340 
[-8.45] 
-0.702 
[-31.83] 
-- -- -- -- 
Adjusted R2 0.9596 0.9310 0.8978 0.8922 0.9209 0.9563 0.9377 0.9184 0.9243 0.9709 -- -- -- -- 
             
             
Panel 4: US-only universe            
Panel 4A:  CAPM             
Alpha (%) 0.003 
[3.32] 
0.001 
[0.46] 
0.001 
[-0.05] 
0.001 
[0.95] 
-0.001 
[-1.15] 
-0.001 
[-1.08] 
-0.001 
[-0.80] 
-0.001 
[-1.12] 
-0.001 
[-1.02] 
-0.001 
[-0.59] 
-0.001 
[-0.06] 
0.007 
[2.49]* 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.992 
[37.57] 
1.039 
[39.59] 
1.014 
[31.63] 
1.011 
[26.93] 
0.989 
[32.42] 
1.077 
[25.86] 
0.961 
[28.12] 
0.957 
[29.61] 
0.851 
[21.07] 
0.924 
[27.10] 
0.070 
[1.67] 
-0.291 
[-2.89] 
Adjusted R2 0.9311 0.9204 0.9236 0.9277 0.9274 0.9327 0.9346 0.9166 0.8836 0.8976 0.0193 0.1327 
             
Panel 4B:  FF3F             
Alpha (%) 0.001 
[1.07] 
-0.002 
[-1.29] 
-0.001 
[-0.39] 
0.001 
[0.44] 
-0.003 
[-3.11] 
-0.002 
[-1.50] 
0.001 
[0.50] 
0.001 
[1.18] 
0.001 
[0.42] 
0.002 
[1.11] 
-0.004 
[-2.02]* 
-0.001 
[-0.08] 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.986 
[41.68] 
1.031 
[39.95] 
1.012 
[36.16] 
1.008 
[32.89] 
0.982 
[35.34] 
1.073 
[30.26] 
0.966 
[30.09] 
0.967 
[34.6] 
0.855 
[30.78] 
0.930 
[32.4] 
0.058 
[1.40] 
-0.251 
[-2.66] 
Beta: SMB -0.082 
[-2.49] 
-0.121 
[-3.13] 
-0.028 
[-0.7] 
-0.031 
[-0.86] 
-0.105 
[-2.69] 
-0.045 
[-1.06] 
0.080 
[1.89] 
0.143 
[4.17] 
0.070 
[1.50] 
0.107 
[2.02] 
-0.185 
[-2.70] 
-0.340 
[-2.52] 
Beta: HML -0.079 
[-2.27] 
0.006 
[0.19] 
-0.073 
[-2.54] 
-0.106 
[-2.21] 
-0.007 
[-0.18] 
-0.094 
[-2.4] 
0.033 
[1.06] 
0.091 
[2.37] 
-0.200 
[-2.77] 
-0.132 
[-3.35] 
0.054 
[1.13] 
0.070 
[0.68] 
Adjusted R2 0.9356 0.9245 0.9253 0.9321 0.9308 0.9360 0.9369 0.9276 0.9095 0.9107 0.0874 0.2117 
             
Panel 4C:  Carhart 4F             
Alpha (%) 0.001 
[0.59] 
-0.002 
[-1.26] 
0.001 
[-0.36] 
0.001 
[0.57] 
-0.003 
[-2.49] 
-0.002 
[-1.17] 
0.001 
[0.34] 
0.001 
[1.11] 
0.002 
[1.79] 
0.002 
[1.39] 
-0.005 
[-2.32]** 
-0.001 
[-0.14] 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.965 
[41.83] 
1.036 
[34.72] 
1.015 
[33.46] 
1.018 
[40.60] 
1.016 
[34.02] 
1.095 
[31.98] 
0.957 
[30.31] 
0.955 
[43.79] 
0.931 
[43.10] 
0.955 
[35.29] 
0.014 
[0.34] 
-0.262 
[-2.70] 
Beta: SMB -0.115 
[-3.00] 
-0.114 
[-2.65] 
-0.023 
[-0.56] 
-0.016 
[-0.35] 
-0.053 
[-1.11] 
-0.012 
[-0.22] 
0.065 
[1.38] 
0.124 
[3.62] 
0.189 
[4.40] 
0.144 
[2.52] 
-0.254 
[-3.55] 
-0.357 
[-2.42] 
Beta: HML -0.090 
[-2.37] 
0.009 
[0.24] 
-0.071 
[-2.28] 
-0.101 
[-2.15] 
0.010 
[0.29] 
-0.083 
[-1.90] 
0.028 
[0.98] 
0.085 
[2.15] 
-0.161 
[-3.34] 
-0.120 
[-3.55] 
0.032 
[0.63] 
0.064 
[0.64] 
Beta: Momentum -0.034 
[-1.44] 
0.007 
[0.30] 
0.005 
[0.18] 
0.015 
[0.48] 
0.054 
[2.21] 
0.034 
[0.82] 
-0.015 
[-0.56] 
-0.020 
[-0.54] 
0.123 
[4.75] 
0.039 
[1.52] 
-0.071 
[-2.25] 
-0.022 
[-0.43] 
Adjusted R2 0.9364 0.9241 0.9248 0.9319 0.9335 0.9366 0.9367 0.9275 0.9296 0.9119 0.1110 0.2079 
             
Panel 4D:  Liquidity 2F (1y)             
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Alpha (%) 0.003 
[3.08] 
0.001 
[0.42] 
0.001 
[0.18] 
0.001 
[0.96] 
-0.002 
[-2.00] 
-0.001 
[-0.88] 
-0.001 
[-1.08] 
-0.002 
[-1.16] 
0.001 
[1.18] 
0.001 
[0.08] 
-0.001 
[-0.34] 
0.005 
[1.88]* 
Beta: Market (excess return) 1.008 
[40.54] 
1.040 
[35.86] 
1.027 
[32.28] 
1.021 
[31.61] 
0.965 
25.53] 
1.092 
[24.06] 
0.947 
[28.05] 
0.948 
[29.47] 
0.947 
[40.9] 
0.961 
[35.67] 
0.048 
[1.07] 
-0.439 
[-3.55] 
Beta: Liquidity 0.039 
[0.89] 
0.002 
[0.04] 
0.031 
[0.79] 
0.024 
[0.52] 
-0.060 
[-1.24] 
0.037 
[0.79] 
-0.035 
[-1.12] 
-0.021 
[-0.45] 
0.241 
[4.75] 
0.094 
[1.93] 
-0.055 
[-0.91] 
0.116 
[1.52] 
Adjusted R2 0.9314 0.9199 0.9236 0.9275 0.9288 0.9329 0.9349 0.9163 0.9203 0.9019 0.0214 0.1512 
             
Panel 4E:  Investor Protection 
2F (1y) 
            
Alpha (%) 0.001 
[1.67] 
0.001 
[-0.07] 
0.001 
[-0.17] 
0.001 
[0.83] 
-0.001 
[-1.22] 
-0.001 
[-0.93] 
-0.001 
[-0.51] 
-0.001 
[-0.61] 
-0.001 
[-1.00] 
0.001 
[1.67] 
-- -- -- -- 
Beta: Market (excess return) 0.963 
[45.25] 
1.027 
[36.80] 
1.012 
[31.19] 
1.009 
[28.52] 
0.988 
[31.80] 
1.082 
[25.90] 
0.967 
[28.57] 
0.969 
[32.26] 
0.851 
[21.49] 
0.963 
[45.25] 
-- -- -- -- 
Beta: Investor Protect 0.435 
[8.63] 
0.180 
[3.00] 
0.041 
[0.92] 
0.034 
[0.51] 
0.008 
[0.18] 
-0.069 
[-1.25] 
-0.091 
[-2.31] 
-0.182 
[-3.88] 
0.010 
[0.14] 
-0.565 
[-11.18] 
-- -- -- -- 
Adjusted R2 0.9649 0.9252 0.9234 0.9274 0.9270 0.9330 0.9358 0.9224 0.8829 0.9610 -- -- -- -- 
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Table 5  Time varying parameter model tests of CAPM-type and multifactor models using monthly excess returns for decile liquidity-sorted 
portfolios with annual and monthly rebalancing, momentum and country portfolios for the period January 2001 – August 2014 
This table reports the average time varying alpha terms, proportions of the sample for which the lower standard error band is negative (that is, where the alpha lacks statistical 
significance) and proportions of testing asset portfolios (deciles or quintile portfolios) where convergence is achieved.  Time-varying parameter Kalman filter CAPM-type and 
multifactor CAPM-based models are used where these are based on CAPM, three factor Fama and French (1993) Size and Book-to-Market augmented CAPM, Liu (2006) two factor 
liquidity-augmented CAPM and the two factor investor protection augmented CAPM. 1y indicates annual rebalancing used in factor formation (as opposed to monthly rebalancing).  
< denotes the largest negative value of each of the three information criterion (that is the model of choice). 
 Time series Information criterion   Time series Information criterion  
 Mean 
alpha 
% SE 
(alpha) 
negative 
SBC HQC AIC % 
Converge 
 Mean 
alpha 
% SE 
(alpha) 
negative 
SBC HQC AIC % 
Converge 
Panel 1: World market 
universe 
Size decile portfolios     Book-to-Market decile portfolios   
CAPM 0.0044 85.29 -4.94 -4.90 -4.92 100.00  0.0040 88.36 -5.07 -5.03 -5.05 100.00 
FF3F 0.0018 86.05 -5.31 -5.23 -5.28 40.00  0.0030 81.36 -5.16< -5.08< -5.12< 60.00 
Carhart 4F 0.0014 87.83 -5.07 -4.97 -5.03 40.00  0.0049 78.95 -4.92 -4.82 -4.88 40.00 
Liquidity 2F (1yr) 0.0076 80.27 -5.17 -5.11 -5.15 30.00  0.0041 86.09 -5.12 -5.06 -5.09 70.00 
Investor Protect 2F (1yr) 0.0037 81.97 -5.61< -5.56< -5.59< 40.00  0.0037 85.75 -5.05 -5.00 -5.03 60.00 
              
 Investor Protection-1y decile portfolios    Country portfolios    
CAPM 0.0033 86.32 -5.23 -5.19 -5.21 100.00  0.0011 92.12 -2.60 -2.56 -2.58 80.85 
FF3F 0.0037 84.87 -4.76 -4.69 -4.73 50.00  0.0001 90.79 -2.66 -2.58 -2.63 36.17 
Carhart 4F 0.0033 85.24 -4.90 -4.80 -4.86 70.00  0.0004 91.08 -22.81< -22.72< -22.78< 89.36 
Liquidity 2F (1yr) 0.0043 80.27 -5.31 -5.26 -5.29 20.00  0.0015 91.23 -2.71 -2.65 -2.69 44.68 
Investor Protect 2F (1yr) 0.0033 83.04 -5.69< -5.63< -5.66< 90.00  0.0007 91.42 -2.23 -2.17 -2.20 46.81 
              
Panel 2: World developed 
market universe 
Size decile portfolios     Book-to-Market decile portfolios   
CAPM 0.0040 84.93 -5.00 -4.96 -4.98 100.00  0.0033 86.45 -5.37 -5.34 -5.36 100.00 
FF3F 0.0035 82.73 -5.26 -5.19< -5.23 80.00  0.0034 82.15 -5.35 -5.27 -5.31 80.00 
Carhart 4F 0.0016 86.84 -5.28< -5.19< -5.25< 30.00  0.0039 83.97 -5.26 -5.17 -5.22 70.00 
Liquidity 2F (1yr) 0.0039 83.19 -5.08 -4.52 -5.06 90.00  0.0041 83.19 -5.35 -5.30 -5.33 90.00 
Investor Protect 2F (1yr) 0.0041 84.58 -4.92 -4.87 -4.90 90.00  0.0039 82.89 -5.39< -5.34< -5.37< 70.00 
              
 Investor Protection-1y decile portfolios    Country portfolios    
CAPM 0.0034 86.32 -5.23 -5.19 -5.21 100.00  0.0012 92.12 -2.60 -2.56 -2.59 80.85 
FF3F 0.0038 84.87 -4.76 -4.69 -4.73 50.00  0.0001 90.79 -2.66 -2.59 -2.63 36.17 
Carhart 4F 0.0033 85.24 -4.90 -4.80 -4.86 70.00  0.0004 91.08 -22.82< -22.73< -22.78< 89.36 
Liquidity 2F (1yr) 0.0043 80.27 -5.31 -5.26 -5.29 20.00  0.0016 91.23 -2.72 -2.66 -2.69 44.68 
Investor Protect 2F (1yr) 0.0033 83.04 -5.69< -5.63< -5.66< 90.00  0.0008 91.42 -2.23 -2.17 -2.21 46.81 
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Panel 3: World emerging 
market universe 
Size decile portfolios     Book-to-Market decile portfolios   
CAPM 0.0052 91.16 -3.63 -3.59 -3.61 70.00  0.0067 91.28 -3.49 -3.45 -3.47 80.00 
FF3F 0.0028 89.34 -4.38< -4.30< -4.35< 50.00  0.0028 89.12 -4.38< -4.30< -4.35< 50.00 
Carhart 4F 0.0041 64.47 -4.02 -3.93 -3.98 10.00  0.0041 64.47 -4.02 -3.93 -3.98 10.00 
Liquidity 2F (1yr) 0.0021 89.04 -4.07 -4.02 -4.05 60.00  0.0021 89.04 -4.07 -4.02 -4.05 60.00 
Investor Protect 2F (1yr) 0.0023 90.53 -3.97 -3.91 -3.95 50.00  0.0023 90.34 -3.97 -3.91 -3.95 50.00 
              
 Investor Protection-1y decile portfolios    Country portfolios    
CAPM 0.0032 88.16 -4.35 -4.32 -4.34 90.00  0.0035 91.30 -1.96 -1.92 -1.94 100.00 
FF3F 0.0045 83.81 -4.53< -4.45< -4.50< 50.00  -0.0009 91.69 -1.76 -1.69 -1.73 47.83 
Carhart 4F 0.0036 86.84 -4.31 -4.22 -4.27 40.00  0.0017 90.98 -1.77 -1.68 -1.73 34.78 
Liquidity 2F (1yr) 0.0032 87.17 -4.24 -4.19 -4.22 80.00  0.0052 89.51 -1.97< -1.92< -1.94< 73.91 
Investor Protect 2F (1yr) 0.0036 87.76 -4.41 -4.35 -4.39 60.00  0.0057 90.07 -1.81 -1.75 -1.79 43.48 
              
Panel 4: US only universe Size decile portfolios     Book-to-Market decile portfolios   
CAPM 0.0032 89.21 -4.70 -4.66 -4.68 100.00  0.0033 89.28 -4.51 -4.47 -4.49 100.00 
FF3F 0.0072 77.55 -4.71 -4.63 -4.68 40.00  0.0028 84.01 -4.55 -4.48< -4.52 60.00 
Carhart 4F 0.0056 68.71 -5.04< -4.95< -5.00< 10.00  0.0035 83.81 -4.57< -4.47 -4.53< 50.00 
Liquidity 2F (1yr) 0.0018 90.46 -4.71 -4.66 -4.69 80.00  0.0033 88.30 -4.47 -4.41 -4.45 90.00 
Investor Protect 2F (1yr) 0.0041 86.51 -4.53 -4.48 -4.51 60.00  0.0035 86.73 -4.49 -4.43 -4.46 60.00 
              
 Investor Protection-1y decile portfolios    Country portfolios    
CAPM 0.0033 88.03 -4.75 -4.71 -4.74 100.00  0.0044 95.72 -4.79 -4.75 -4.77 100.00 
FF3F 0.0032 83.55 -4.67 -4.59 -4.64 40.00  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Carhart 4F 0.0034 77.96 -4.58 -4.49 -4.54 20.00  0.0039 52.30 -6.22< -6.13< -6.18< 100.00 
Liquidity 2F (1yr) 0.0032 86.94 -4.76 -4.70 -4.74 80.00  0.0040 79.61 -5.77 -5.71 -5.75 100.00 
Investor Protect 2F (1yr) 0.0031 90.95 -4.98< -4.93< -4.96< 50.00  0.0036 78.91 -5.54 -5.49 -5.52 100.00 
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Figure 1 
Global equity market firm sample by country and region, January 2001 to August 2014 
The figure shows the distribution of sample stocks by country or region, with the sample size and percentage of the total for 
each.  The sample selection criteria are described in the data section. 
North America, 743.49, 19%
Europe Developed, 827.69, 21%
Scandinavia, 317.16, 8%
Europe Emerging, 124.71, 3%
MEA Developed, 78.36, 2%
MEA Emerging, 285.97, 7%
Australasia, 184.34, 5%
Asia Developed, 442.27, 12%
Asia Emerging, 692.56, 18%
Latin America, 188.86, 5%
 
 
Figure 2 
Global equity market firm sample by month, January 2001 to August 2014 
The figure shows the distribution of sample stocks by region and month.  The sample selection criteria are described in the 
data section.   
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Appendix A. Table 1A. 
Datastream variable definitions 
All data are from Datastream and Worldscope (accessed through Datastream) with the exception of the MSCI index range, 
which are from the MSCI website http://www.msci.com/products/indexes/country_and_regional/dm/.  *High income 
threshold for 2012: GNI per capita of USD 12,615 (World Bank, Atlas method) 
Coverage Index Description Datastream 
Mnemonic 
MSCI Developed North America:  Canada, US 
 
Europe Developed:  Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, 
UK 
 
Scandinavia:  Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden 
 
Middle East & Africa 
Developed:  Israel 
 
Asia Developed:  Singapore, 
Japan, Hong Kong 
Country must meet 3 criteria: 
(1) Sustainable economic development.  Country 
GNI per capita 25% above the World Bank high 
income threshold* for 3 consecutive years 
(2) Size and Liquidity Requirements: 
- Company size (full market cap):  USD 2519 mm 
- Security size (float market cap):  USD 1260 mm 
- Security liquidity:  20% ATVR 
(3) Market Accessibility Criteria: 
- Openness to foreign ownership:  Very high 
- Ease of capital inflows / outflows:  Very high 
- Efficiency of the operational framework:  Very 
high 
- Stability of the institutional framework:  Very 
high 
N/A (MSCI) 
MSCI Emerging Latin America:  Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru 
 
Europe Emerging:  Czech Rep., 
Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Russia 
 
Middle East & Africa 
Emerging:  Egypt, Qatar, South 
Africa, Turkey, UAE, 
 
Asia Emerging:  China, India, 
Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, 
Thailand 
Country must meet 3 criteria: 
(1) Sustainable economic development.  No 
requirement 
(2) Size and Liquidity Requirements: 
- Company size (full market cap):  USD 1260 mm 
- Security size (float market cap):  USD 630 mm 
- Security liquidity:  15% ATVR 
(3) Market Accessibility Criteria: 
- Openness to foreign ownership:  Significant 
- Ease of capital inflows / outflows:  Significant 
- Efficiency of the operational framework:  Good 
and tested 
- Stability of the institutional framework:  Modest 
N/A (MSCI) 
Individual market indices   
North America    
Canada S&P/TSX Composite [251] Source:  S&P/TSX LTTOCOMP 
US Nasdaq 100 Nasdaq 100 [103] Source:  Nasdaq LNASA10W 
US S&P 100 S&P 100 [101] Source:  S&P LS&P100I 
Europe Developed   
France France CAC Large 60 [60] Source:  Euronext Paris LFRCLR60 
Germany DJ DAX 100 [100] Source:  Deutsche Börse LDAX100I0700 
Austria ATX 50 [53] Source: Wiener Bourse LATXIN500601 
Belgium BEL All-Share [137] Source:  Belgium stock exchange LBRUSIDX 
Ireland ISEQ Overall [47] Source:  Irish stock exchange LISEQUIT 
Italy All Stars [74] Source:  Milan Bourse LMIBASTR 
Netherlands All Share General [140] Source:  CBS LCBSKGEN 
Portugal PSI All-Share [47] Source:  Euronext Lisbon LPOPSIGN 
Spain Madrid SE General [108] Source:  Bolsas y Mercados Españoles LMADRIDI 
Switzerland Medium Large companies [100] Source:  SWX Swiss stock exchange LSWMLCOS 
UK FTSE 100 [101] Source:  FTSE LFTSE100 
Scandinavia    
Denmark OMX Copenhagen [150] Source:  Nasdaq OMX [150] LCOSEASH 
Finland OMX Helsinki [131] Source:  Nasdaq OMX LHEXINDX 
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Norway Oslo GFBX [18] Source:  Oslo Bors LOSLOGFB 
Sweden OMX Stockholm Benchmark 
[71] 
Source:  Nasdaq OMX LSWEBENC 
Europe Emerging   
Czech Republic Prague SE PX Global [24] Source:  Prague stock exchange LCZPXGLB 
Hungary Budapest (BUX) [14] Source:  Budapest stock exchange LBUXINDX 
Poland Warsaw General 20 [20] Source:  Warsaw stock exchange LPOLWG20 
Russia Federation MICEX Composite [50] Source:  Red Star Financial LRSMICEX 
Russia Federation Russian RTS [50] Source:  Red Star Financial LRSRTSIN 
Greece Athex Composite [60] Source:  Athens stock exchange LGRAGENL 
Middle East & Africa (MEA) Developed   
Israel Dow Jones Tel Aviv 100 [101] Source:  Israel stock exchange LISTA100 
Middle East & Africa (MEA) Emerging   
Egypt Hermes Financial [43] Source: Egyptian Stock Exchange LEGHFINC 
South Africa FTSE/ JSE Top 40 [42] Source:  FTSE LJSEAL40 
Qatar S&P Qatar Domestic price 
index in US$ [35] 
Source:  S&P LSPDQAT$ 
Turkey BIST National 100 [100] Source:  Istanbul stock exchange LTRKISTB 
UAE (Abu Dhabi) DS market constituents [50] Source:  Thomson Datastream LTOTAE 
UAE (Dubai) DS market constituents [57] Source:  Thomson Datastream FDUBAI 
Australasia    
Australia S&P/ASX 200 [200] Source:  S&P/ASX LASX200I 
New Zealand NZX 50 [50] Source:  New Zealand stock exchange LNZ50CAP 
Asia Developed    
Japan S&P TOPIX 150 [150] Source  Standard & Poors LSPTOPIX 
Singapore TR Singapore (Composite) 
[183] 
Source:  Thomson Reuters LXSGFLDL 
Hong Kong S&P Hong Kong [200] Source:  Standard & Poors LSBBVHK$ 
Asia Emerging    
China (Shanghai) Shanghai SE 180 [180] Source:  Shanghai stock exchange LCHSH180 
China (Shenzhen) Shenzhen SE 100 [100] Source:  Shenzhen stock exchange LCHZH100 
India (Bombay) S&P BSE (100) National [100] Source: S&P. 100 stocks from across India.   LIBOMBSE 
Indonesia Jakarta LQ45 (Top 45) [45] Source:  Indonesian stock exchange LJAKLQ45 
Malaysia Composite [102] Source:  FTSE LFBMKLCI0901 
Philippines Manila Composite [30] Source:  Philippine stock exchange LPSECOMP 
South Korea KOSPI 100 [100] Source:  Korea stock exchange LKOR100I 
Taiwan Taiwan Top 100 [100] Source:  Taiwan stock exchange LTATP100 
Thailand Bangkok SET 100 [100] Source:  Stock exchange of Thailand LBNGK100 
Latin America    
Brazil Brazil (IBX) [99] Source:  Sao Paolo stock exchange LBRIBXIN 
Chile IPSA [40] Source:  Santiago stock exchange LIPSASEL 
Colombia Worldscope coverage [63] Source:  Worldscope via Datastream COLOM 
Mexico Indice Compuesto del Mercado 
Acciones [60] 
Source:  Mexican stock exchange LMXIRTCM 
Peru Lima Selective [15] Source:  Lima Stock Exchange LPESELEC 
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Appendix B Table 1B. 
Datastream variable and Worldwide governance indicator definitions 
All data are from Datastream and Worldscope (accessed through Datastream) with the exception of the six World Bank 
Governance indices, which are from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
Variable Definition Datastream 
Mnemonic 
Datastream items  
Free Float 
Number Of 
Shares 
The percentage of total shares in issue available to ordinary investors (NOSHFF).  That 
means total number of shares (NOSH) less the strategic holdings (NOSHST). In general, 
only holdings of 5% or more are counted as strategic. 
 
Strategic ownership data is collected by the Thomson Reuters Ownership team, the data is 
derived from 11 primary sources, including SEC filings (such as schedule 13D and form 
13FD) and the UK Register. Also annual, interim reports, stock exchanges, official 
regulatory bodies, third party vendors, company websites, approved news sources and 
direct contact with company investor relations departments 
 
Ownership updates were obtained at end of month prior to August 2009 while after this 
date values are updated on the 10th and 30th of each month 
 
Strategic holdings are defined as the sum of the following categories of shareholding: 
(1) Government:  State (government) or state (government) institution (NOSHGV) 
(2) Cross Holdings:  Holdings by one company in another (NOSHCO) 
(3) Pension Fund:  Pension funds or Endowment funds (NOSHPF) 
(4) Investment Co.:  Investment banks or institutions seeking a long term return. Note 
that holdings by Hedge Funds are not included (NOSHIC) 
(5) Employees:  Employees, or by those with a substantial position in a company that 
provides significant voting power at an annual general meeting, (typically family 
members) (NOSHEM) 
(6) Other holdings:  Entities outside one of the above categories (NOSHOF) 
(7) Foreign block holders:  Holdings by an institution domiciled in a country other 
than that of the issuer (NOSHFR) 
NOSHFF 
   
Price This is the adjusted default official daily closing price.  It is denominated in primary units 
of local currency.  Prices are generally based on ‘last trade’ or an official price fixing.  The 
‘current’ prices taken at the close of market are stored each day. These stored prices are 
adjusted for subsequent capital actions, and this adjusted figure then becomes the default 
price available 
P 
   
Book to 
Market Value 
This is defined as the inverse of the market value of the ordinary (common) equity divided 
by the balance sheet value of the ordinary (common) equity in the company (Worldscope 
item 03501) which is available through Datastream 
BTMV 
   
Traded 
Volume 
This shows the number of shares traded for a stock on a particular day.  The data type is 
reported in thousands.  Both daily and non-daily figures are adjusted for capital events. 
However, if a capital event occurs in the latest period of a non-daily request, then the 
volume for that particular period only is retrieved as unadjusted. 
VO 
   
Number of 
Shares 
This is the total number of ordinary shares that represent the capital of the company.  The 
data type is expressed in thousands. 
NOSH 
   
Worldwide governance indicators  
Voice and 
Accountability 
This captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate 
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media 
-- -- 
   
Political 
Stability and 
This measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence 
-- -- 
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Absence of 
Violence/ 
Terrorism 
and terrorism. 
   
Government 
Effectiveness 
This captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to 
such policies 
-- -- 
   
Regulatory 
Quality 
This captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
-- -- 
   
Rule of Law This captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
-- -- 
   
Control of 
Corruption 
This captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate 
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media 
-- -- 
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Appendix C. Table 1C.  Empirical models 
This table outlines the time invariant (Panel A) and the time varying parameter models (Panel B). The time invariant parameter models are 
estimated by OLS. The conditional betas of the Kalman-filter time-varying parameter models are estimated using the observation equation, 
where Rit and RMt are the excess returns of the individual and market portfolios at time t and t  is the disturbance term. The exact form of 
the related transition equation depends on the nature of the stochastic process the betas are assumed to follow and in this case a simple 
random walk process is imposed, following Brooks et al (1998). The observation equation and the transition equation constitute the Kalman 
filter state space model.  However, a set of prior conditional values are necessary for the Kalman filter to forecast the future value. This 
technique uses the first two observations to establish the prior conditions and then estimates the entire series recursively providing 
conditional estimates of the parameters. The random walk specification imposes a filter on the data where parameters evolve smoothly and 
are contingent on the observations surrounding time t.  The exact amount of data around time t needed to estimate the coefficients, that is, 
the dependent variable in state equations, is contingent on their variance and is estimated from the data.  This approach is appropriate for the 
measurement of time evolving risk premiums for market and investor protection factors (Grout and Zalewska, 2006). Thus, one-step ahead 
predicted states and their associated standard errors are estimated for all FMPs.   
 
Panel A: Time invariant parameter models Panel B:Time varying parameter models 
Model 1a: CAPM 
The standard CAPM can be estimated by OLS regression: 
itftmtMiftpt rrrr   )(  
Model 1b: CAPM 
The conditional betas are estimated using the following observation equation: 
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Model 2a: FF3F 
Following Fama and French (1993), additional SMB and HML terms are the 
size and book-to-market factors and estimated by OLS regression: 
ittHMLtSMBftmtMiftpt HMLSMBrrrr   )(  
Model 2b: FF3F 
The conditional betas are estimated using the following observation equation: 
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with prior conditional values denoted by: 
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Model 3a: Carhart 4F 
Following Carhart (1997), we augment FF3F with the momentum term, 
which is estimated by OLS regression: 
ittMomtHMLtSMBftmtMiftpt MomHMLSMBrrrr   )(  
Model 3b: Carhart 4F 
The conditional betas are estimated using the following observation equation: 
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The corresponding transition equation is defined: 
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Model 4a: Liquidity 2F 
Liu (2006) introduces a two-factor liquidity model, which is estimated by 
OLS regression: 
ittIlliqftmtiiftit ILLIQrrrr   )(  
We use two versions of the investor protection factor, created from the two 
rebalancing methods, monthly and annual, both with annual holding periods. 
Model 4b: Liquidity 2F 
The conditional betas are estimated using following the observation equation: 
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The corresponding transition equation is defined: 
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Model 5a: Investor Protection 2F 
A two-factor CAPM augmented with the new investor protection factor to 
account for institutional differences across international markets is proposed 
and can be stated 
     )( PROTECTINVErrErrE PROTECTINVftmtMftpt  
where ptr  is the returns on a portfolio p of stocks at time interval t, mtr  is the 
returns on the market portfolio and ftr  the risk free rate.  INV-PROTECT is 
the investor protection factor.  This can be rearranged and estimated by OLS 
regression 
ittPROTECTINVftmtMiftpt PROTECTINVrrrr   )(
where i  is the constant, M  is the market coefficient and it  is an iid 
disturbance term.  We use two versions of the investor protection factor, 
created from the two rebalancing methods, monthly and annual, both with 
annual holding periods. 
Model 5b: Investor Protection 2F 
The conditional betas are estimated using the following observation equation 
),0(~,)(   NPROTECTINVRR tt
Kalman
PROTECTitINVMt
Kalman
ittit   
The corresponding transition equation is defined: 
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Appendix D. Block owner categories per investor protection sorted decile 
As an additional exercise we report the distribution of the seven ownership categories across the ten decile sorted investor protection 
portfolios.  These are reported in the Table 1D below.  Four sets of distributions are given, one for each market universe.  The overall 
sample is in panel 1, the emerging market in panel 2, the developed market in panel 3 and the US alone in panel 4.  Evidence for all four 
universes supports the hypothesis regarding concentration of control versus cash-flow rights in relation to the quality of the external 
contracting environment and investor protection (see La Porta et al, 1999; Doidge et al, 2004; Dyck and Zingales, 2004).  Some interesting 
observations can be made. The proportions of cross-shareholding networks used to separate ownership from control dominate the weakest 
investor protection deciles in the overall universe (panel 1) and this trend is also seen in the developed market universe (panel 3).  However, 
it is clearly missing in the emerging market universe (panel 2) where there is a very high proportion of cross shareholding networks and this 
is evenly distributed across all investor protection deciles.  Another clear difference between the World emerging and World developed 
market universes is the increasing trend of insider employee/family ownership from low to high investor protection in the former (panel 2) 
but a decreasing trend in the latter (panel 3).  In contrast, the proportion of foreign ownership between both developed and emerging market 
universes shows an increasing trend from minimal ownership in highest investor protection deciles (D9 and D10) to a significant 
concentration in the lowest investor protection deciles (D1 and D2).  State ownership is minimal and generally confined to the weakest 
investor protection portfolios across all market universes.  Finally, it is noted that increased ownership by investment companies and pension 
funds is strongly concentrated in developed markets (panel 2c) and in particular, in the US where this is the most common form of 
ownership (panel 2d). 
 
Table 1D.  Block owner categories per investor protection sorted decile 
The second panel provides details of block shareholders per decile-sorted investor protection portfolio by category.  These are cross-shareholder networks, 
employee/family, foreign, state, institutional investor, other, and pension funds.  Categories of block shareholder are from Datastream. 
 
Block owners (%)           
Panel 1: World Market universe D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 
Cross-shareholder networks 52.21 24.64 30.98 32.02 25.29 19.72 8.48 4.32 4.59 3.30 
Employee/ Family 7.87 22.00 17.59 15.52 21.60 5.73 11.31 10.21 16.47 5.40 
Foreign 12.61 9.82 9.17 14.81 12.86 4.79 3.54 4.38 8.97 0.28 
State 9.07 0.00 4.21 1.05 3.33 0.00 0.00 1.29 0.00 0.00 
Investment companies 1.77 12.71 1.05 7.09 9.28 9.04 15.22 9.59 5.26 3.12 
Other 0.77 4.24 2.60 6.89 18.57 4.93 1.49 2.23 2.44 0.36 
Pension Funds 1.11 7.32 5.68 0.89 1.71 3.29 2.53 2.19 2.21 1.49 
Panel 2: World Emerging Markets 
universe 
          
Cross-shareholder networks 50.05 42.26 37.29 37.71 29.24 22.74 37.47 27.57 27.18 40.57 
Employee/ Family 8.56 8.40 10.31 22.47 20.55 10.39 16.74 7.04 9.82 29.49 
Foreign 22.25 22.16 13.08 18.54 22.34 5.38 10.16 5.50 8.69 8.95 
State 7.18 6.66 12.55 8.77 4.20 2.69 6.83 5.61 7.39 0.00 
Investment companies 2.40 5.31 10.05 5.62 9.42 2.88 5.78 8.19 5.67 1.50 
Other 3.44 3.86 12.25 2.70 5.34 0.89 4.55 0.70 4.40 0.93 
 56 
Pension Funds 0.38 0.86 0.45 4.99 1.05 4.13 1.58 0.70 3.33 2.53 
Panel 3: World Developed Markets 
universe 
          
Cross-shareholder networks 39.07 39.99 31.54 21.40 14.04 6.19 5.09 7.93 8.11 3.30 
Employee/ Family 38.86 27.60 23.66 19.00 20.28 7.32 15.74 6.88 6.94 5.40 
Foreign 19.03 16.28 6.47 16.36 10.97 4.70 10.95 6.96 6.83 0.28 
State 2.38 0.48 0.00 6.04 0.08 1.77 0.30 0.00 2.40 0.00 
Investment companies 18.44 8.89 15.67 6.36 8.68 12.60 8.54 6.28 10.54 3.12 
Other 4.24 5.40 24.27 9.15 11.44 6.85 7.43 5.10 2.49 0.36 
Pension Funds 1.51 0.79 6.43 2.18 3.60 5.32 0.21 2.31 4.74 1.49 
Panel 4: US only universe           
Cross-shareholder networks 1.96 1.36 5.32 0.00 4.50 4.67 2.90 5.02 3.22 2.92 
Employee/ Family 11.17 2.73 6.66 3.45 4.89 3.79 0.48 3.81 3.14 0.48 
Foreign 4.78 2.27 2.13 2.74 4.60 2.51 1.52 2.11 4.15 5.77 
State 1.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Investment companies 25.63 24.86 18.21 22.14 19.43 17.07 14.37 17.72 11.57 4.16 
Other 0.41 2.15 1.37 0.58 0.00 1.29 0.00 0.00 0.40 4.83 
Pension Funds 4.07 7.54 4.42 4.46 4.77 3.32 4.19 2.14 3.43 3.44 
 
 
